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ABSTRACT 
 
Performance-based compensation is gaining traction in the education systems of 
countries that lead in the world economy and in comparative international assessments of student 
achievement. Longstanding and contemporary debates in educational policy and research 
question the potential of this incentivist policy to improve teaching. Some scholars warn that 
decades of experimental research have found bonuses yield little or no improvement in various 
measures of teaching quality and student achievement. Yet, policymakers and performance-pay 
advocates maintain that financial bonuses will lead to better teaching, student learning, and 
educational markets. As PBC persists, we remain unaware of how financial bonuses are enacted 
and shape teaching. 
To better understand how financial bonuses shape teaching, recent qualitative research 
has investigated exactly how performance-based compensation unfolds inside of complex school 
settings. Building on this emerging scholarship, this research examined the implementation of 
merit pay and its effects on teaching from the perspectives of teachers at School M1, a high 
performing elementary school in Shanghai. Those who aspire for high ranks in comparative 
international assessments and other proxies of global economic leadership are turning to regions 
such as Shanghai for lessons on “what works.” Shanghai thus provided the opportunity to 
investigate incentivism in a system that has gained global influence yet whose policies and 
corresponding practices remain understudied. A principal and 20 teachers were interviewed, and 
a range of policy documents were collected in This qualitative case study. Data were coded 
according to theory on incentivism, policy enactment, and teacher development. Responses were 
then further analyzed to determine recurring themes and patterns. 
I find that state and national policymakers and the M1 Principal intended for PBC to 
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improve teaching quality. However, the M1 teacher participants perceived bonuses were 
intended to augment base pay, compensate teachers for their existing effort, and to provoke 
teachers to exert additional effort. Teachers had little understanding of merit pay implementation 
processes. While merit pay did not erode teacher relationships, and norms of respect and 
deference to authority guided teachers’ silence on and acceptance of the policy and shaped their 
participation in policy enactment. They perceived high expectancy, low instrumentality and 
valence, and they held mixed views on fairness.  
The majority of teachers suggested their sense of motivation and self-efficacy was driven 
by a sense of personal responsibility for collective good and by public displays of recognition 
from their peers and superiors. Teachers suggested that social relationships, professional 
community, and trust were more efficacious ways to get to improved teacher quality. Overall, 
teachers perceived bonuses neither inspired instructional improvement compelled their low 
performing peers to leave the school or the profession. 
Advocates suggest bonuses motivate educators to behave in desirable ways, incentivize 
strong teachers to join and stay in the workforce, and force weak teachers to exit. While 
compelling, this lens ignores how financial incentives operate in the cultural foundations of 
schools. Additionally, teacher perceptions of bonuses bear directly upon how bonuses are levied 
in schools. To assess the efficacy of PBC as a school improvement mechanism, this research 
offers a sorely needed school-level investigation of PBC that explores the perspectives of 
teachers and is founded in sociocultural lenses on school improvement. In doing so, this research 
builds on an emerging body of qualitative research that helps assess the prevailing hypothesis 
that there is a neat relationship between an incentive, teacher practice, and student learning. 
Keywords: performance-based compensation, global education policy, Shanghai  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1980s, across developing and industrialized nations, reforms in educational 
policy and practice increasingly feature accountability and incentives. Often referred to as the 
Global Education Reform Movement (GERM; Sahlberg, 2011), these reforms consist of the 
standardization of public schooling, private participation in the provision of public education, 
and the creation of a mass of high-quality teachers, also known as teacher professionalization. 
The competition, free market underpinnings of these approaches are said to combat longstanding 
obstacles to school improvement such as ineffective school boards, bureaucratic teacher unions, 
and inefficient centralized control and funding (Walberg & Bast, 2003.) Advocates purport that 
through standardization, privatization, and teacher professionalization, innovative schools will 
rise, poor schools will exit the market, and the quality of educational markets will improve, 
particularly for underserved students (Chubb & Moe, 1990).  
One such reform that is squarely aimed at teachers and teaching is Performance-Based 
Compensation (PBC). Also known as performance- or merit pay, these financial bonuses are 
granted to individuals or groups of employees based upon the attainment of predetermined 
performance criteria. Australian Parliament member Andrew Leigh (2012), defined merit pay as, 
“instances in which teachers receive temporary or permanent salary increases for being more 
effective in the classroom” (p. 1). PBC reflects a New Public Management culture of delivery 
and performativity in school reform (Sahlberg, 2011; Trujillo, 2014). In the context of the 
teacher workforce, bonuses are said to motivate educators to improve instruction, incentivize 
strong teachers to join and stay in the workforce, and encourage weak teachers to exit (Hanushek 
& Lindseth, 2009). Advocates claim individual and group bonuses improve instruction, attrition, 
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professional interactions, and creativity, and generally motivate teachers to behave in ways that 
improve teaching outcomes (Clees & Nabors, 1992; Lavy, 2007; The New Teacher Project, 
2014).  
Performance-Pay: The Nexus of Standardization and Incentivism 
Performance-pay is situated at the crossroads of standardization and incentivism. 
Standardization holds educators accountable for teaching a common curriculum and for students 
achieving at uniformly high quantitative markers of proficiency. Under this framework, learning 
objectives, curriculum, and assessment are aligned with one another and proficiency benchmarks 
are established. Standardization is attractive to policymakers because the combination of 
core/common curricula, lofty performance targets, frequent and onerous testing of students and 
teachers, and test-based accountability create the homogenous conditions necessary to improve 
educational markets in efficient time frames and at low costs (Sahlberg, 2015). Embedded in 
standardization is a focus on core academic subjects such as literacy/language arts, mathematics, 
and science and favoring common, scalable, and measurable pedagogical strategies that 
guarantee teachers will “deliver” the standardized curriculum. State and national annual 
examinations (i.e., “high-stakes tests”) and national learning standards are thus natural features 
of standardization. The U.S. 2001 Common Core State Standards (CCSS) and Great Britain’s 
1988 Education Reform Act represent two accounts of first-time statutory policies that created 
national frameworks for curriculum, and consequently, for standardized assessments (Meyer, 
Tröhler, Labaree, & Hutt, 2014; Yarovaya, 2015).  
In addition to standardization, the current education reform movement exercises 
accountability for teaching improvement through incentivism. Teachers are rewarded through 
financial bonuses and career pathways, and sometimes punished, based upon standardized 
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metrics for preparation, development, and performance. These metrics are embedded in the test-
based student proficiency and growth systems enabled by standardization. Policies like PBC are 
thus viewed as an efficient strategy to improve the teacher labor force, and consequently, create 
more competitive educational markets (Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005). One technique used to 
determine rewards and punishments, Value-Added Modeling (VAMs), is used in sales and 
operations. These models use formulas to attempt to exact and ascribe a particular value of a 
teacher to a student’s or a group of students’ performance. Existing merit pay programs in the 
U.S., for example, use VAMs to determine bonuses, promotion, and retention. As a result, 
incentivism is tightly coupled with teacher and principal promotion, development, and 
evaluation. The U.S. Race To The Top competition, England’s Sure Start, and Ontario, Canada’s 
Literacy and Numeracy are examples of national policies that use performance-pay as an 
accountability device within an overall scheme of incentivism and standardization. 
The Penetration of Performance-Pay In Global Education Policy: The Case of Shanghai 
PBC is highly visible in global education policies (GEP) targeted at teacher 
accountability and improvement. Merit pay has penetrated global education reform rhetoric, 
recommendations, and policy under the economic premise that bonuses lead to optimal 
individual performance (Weiner, 1980). Shanghai is one of a few regions that has adopted PBC 
across an entire state or nation. The case of Shanghai provides an opportunity to fill in the black 
box of incentives at the school level and rigorously examine how financial bonuses occur 
through behavioral, social, and cultural mechanisms inside of schools. By studying Shanghai, we 
can better assess how incentives perform on a large scale and to what extent incentives 
contribute to improved teaching. Specifically, Shanghai’s PBC policies and practices merit 
analysis for three main reasons: 1) Shanghai’s prominence in GEP discourse is based upon 
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popular rhetoric and thin analyses, 2) the shared Confucian learning and teaching cultural norm 
is rare, and 3) Shanghai is the central government’s focal point for domestic policy goals.  
Is It So?: Popular, Thin Rhetoric Needs An Empirical Boost   
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and other policy 
actors in GEP have positioned Shanghai as a world model for education reform. Shanghai has 
gained international recognition as a high performing education system with strong teaching and 
learning outcomes. Today, this metropolis of over 20 million people is featured in global 
education policymaking forums, such as the International Education Roundtable, and in 
conferences hosted by the Asia Society and OECD. This recent spotlight is due in large part to 
Shanghai students’ superior performance in the Programme of International Assessment (PISA), 
the OECD’s famous comparative international assessment. In 2009 and 2012, Shanghai students 
ranked first, and in 2015 they ranked in the top ten in reading, science, and math (PISA 2009 
Results; PISA 2012 Results; PISA 2015 Results).  
Increasingly, high profile comparative assessments, such as PISA, are used to standardize 
progress and competition across the world (Berliner, 2015). Today, PISA and other comparative 
international assessments govern the global framing of accountability and the global aims of 
education (Labaree, 2014; Meyer, Tröhler, Labaree, & Hutt, 2014). Countries that are competing 
for superiority in PISA and in other proxies of global economic leadership (Meyer, 2013; Sellar 
& Lingard, 2013a) deem Shanghai an exemplar of ‘what works’ in schools. Seller and Lingard 
(2013b) explained how post PISA, the U.S. framed Shanghai as a positive archetype of school 
reform and a leader in the “global education race”:  
Tucker’s (2011) edited book, Surpassing Shanghai, constitutes a significant intervention 
into contemporary education reform debates in the US, at a time when US policy-makers 
are looking outwards for reform ideas. Drawing on research conducted by the OECD and 
the US National Centre on Education and the Economy, requested by US education 
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secretary Arne Duncan following the publication of the PISA 2009 results, the book 
provides five case studies of top-performing education systems ‘in the highest ranks in 
terms of quality, equity and productivity’ (Tucker 2011, 172). These include Shanghai-
China, Finland, Japan, Singapore and Canada…The theoretical framework for the study 
is based on a model of the relationships between economic and educational development, 
with the goal for nations being the complementary development of high-skill, high-wage 
knowledge based economies and professional, creative, mass education systems to serve 
them. (p. 717) 
 
Western policymakers are turning outward to “reference societies” such as Shanghai 
(Seller & Lingard, 2013a) to identify effective accountability mechanisms in high performing 
systems. Yet this rhetoric has yet to be substantiated by rigorous, peer-reviewed research. 
Researchers have examined pedagogical approaches unique to Shanghai and neighboring 
countries such as lesson study and call and response. Scholars have also disaggregated PISA data 
and highlighted disproportionately affluent student sample unique to Shanghai students who 
participated in PISA. However, studies of teacher improvement policy implementation and 
impact in Shanghai are not available in internationally reputable, peer-reviewed research 
journals. To move beyond thin accounts of policy and practice and to better understand the 
source of student’s strong performance, rigorous, school-level studies of contemporary policy are 
sorely needed.  
Confucian’s Golden Rule: A Shared Learning and Teaching Culture Across Hundreds of 
Schools 
Chinese people share differences in language, cuisine, environment, wealth, and 
ethnicity. Yet generations and millions of people share a common understanding of and 
appreciation for Confucius, whose “Golden Rule” reminds the Chinese people of the law of 
reciprocity. Confucius’s teachings undergird the culture of learning and teaching across 
Shanghai’s 1,500 schools. Confucian principles of community, individual accountability for 
collective success, fairness through equality, long-term visions for success, and harmonious 
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relationships permeate this high performing education system’s philosophy of learning and 
teaching (Bozionelos, & Wang, 2007; Sellar & Lingard, 2013).  
Stemming from an appreciation for teamwork and collective success, authentic teacher-
centered improvement activities such as peer observation and team-based lesson planning are 
hallmarks of teaching culture. The majority of new teachers receive ongoing mentorship from 
veteran teachers, participate in team-based professional development for at least 50 hours per 
year, and most school leaders have an average of 15 years of teaching experience (OECD, 
2012a; OECD, 2012b). Shanghai thus reveals a rare opportunity to gather teachers’ perspectives 
on financial bonuses in school cultures that weave standardization and incentives with norms of 
community and equality. 
The Country’s Shining Star: Fulfilling Domestic Policy Goals Through Shanghai 
Shanghai’s 1990s First Class City, First Class Education policy is grounded in broader 
goals of leading in the global knowledge economy. The policy calls for education reforms in 
order to innovate, raise international competitiveness, and enhance educational quality (Lai & 
Lo, 2007; OECD, 2012a; Tucker, 2011). These reforms include curricular changes such as 
project-based, research-oriented, and Information Technology learning; reforms to school 
admissions criteria; and reduced pressure and administration of testing. Still though, annual and 
rigorous examinations persist as young as third-grade, and student performance is closely 
coupled with financial bonuses and teacher evaluation.  
PBC is a key aspect of compensation reform in Shanghai. Since 2009, teacher salaries are 
comprised of 70 percent base pay and 30 percent merit pay. Individual and team bonuses are 
based a range of metrics, such as student performance on benchmark assessments and 
participation in professional development. Shanghai awards annually a minimum of $2,000 to 
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master teachers whose students perform well on exit exams (OECD, 2012b).  
The Understudy 
England, Wales, and Singapore are examples of the few systems that have national bonus 
pay systems. Empirical investigations of performance-pay implementation and impact that are 
grounded in teacher lenses and sociocultural theoretical approaches in these systems would also 
afford a better understanding of how financial bonuses shape teaching. Yet these systems do not 
share the unique school and system features that belong to the case of Shanghai. Though 
influential in GEP because of its strong stature in the West, England and Wales are not 
contemporary exemplars of “what works.”  
The commonness of Confucian learning and teaching culture also cannot be found in 
these three countries. Each country boasts a great deal of ethnic, linguistic, and cultural diversity. 
School choice abounds, and families have a range of options, including public, private, charter, 
and specialty schools. School type and student community are two prominent factors that make 
school culture quite distinctive across school sites. Indeed, each of Shanghai’s schools hold 
distinguishable cultural characteristics – there are marked differences by class, migrant status, 
and location. However, on the whole, the Confucian values that underpin learning and teaching 
are relatively homogenous across school sites, which enables the potential for a rigorous 
comparative analysis of performance pay across school sites and districts. Although it is a system 
that is achieving well, and gaining global prominence, Shanghai remains understudied.  provides 
sorely needed analysis of the penetration and performance of PBC, a globally popular policy 
device in teacher policy.  
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Not ‘What Works’ or ‘Does It Work,’ How Does It Work? 
Yet, research has suggested PBC has not led to, and in some cases has detracted from, 
school improvement aims. Experimental studies show PBC has done little to substantively 
improve teaching outcomes, such as effort and instruction (Balch & Springer, 2015). Scant 
qualitative research suggests financial incentives incite job stress; stifle collegiality; and may not 
be fully implemented because of resource limitations, capacity weaknesses, and educators’ 
perceptions of a lack of fairness (Rice, Malen, Jackson, & Hoyer, 2015). Nonetheless, the policy 
is gaining traction. As PBC gains traction globally, we must better understand how incentives 
operate and the process through which the consequences of performance-pay unfolds in complex 
school settings. Once we look inside schools and communities of teachers, we can begin to 
assess the efficacy of merit pay as a mechanism to improve teacher quality.  
Rather than hypothesizing what works or whether performance incentives work in 
Shanghai, this research digs deep into the black box of incentives inside of schools. I ask how 
performance incentives work from the vantage point of teachers –the main conduits of policy 
enactment and of teaching improvements. I implore teachers to paint a picture of how 
performance-pay is enacted within the culture of learning and teaching. I examine their 
perspectives from sociological and behavioral lenses. These questions and guiding theories are 
rare but necessary for three key reasons. Firstly, knowing enactment leads to knowing where 
policy intentions and reality breakdown and that can lead to lessons for better policy design and 
implementation. Second, school culture is empirically linked to teaching and school 
improvement. Knowing the cultural conditions in which the policy is embedded helps pinpoints 
the exact cultural issues (e.g., trust, equality) that are at odds with the policy. Third, teacher 
perspectives illuminate ways to improve the policy and to improve teaching overall that may 
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otherwise have gone unnoticed.  
Dissertation Overview 
In this qualitative case study, I gathered teachers’ perspectives on how performance pay 
was enacted in School M1 in Shanghai and how bonuses shape instructional improvement.  
In Chapter 2 I examine empirical and descriptive literature on PBC. The descriptive 
literature provides an important overview of the recommended, and currently popular, PBC 
models in P-12 education. I find that, on the whole, experimental studies on the effects of PBC 
have found bonuses do little to substantively improve student and teacher outcomes. England, 
Wales, and the U.S. are well pronounced cases in PBC literature. The research reveals several 
key gaps in the literature that are addressed in this study: 1) how policy actors perceive 
performance incentives; 2) how PBC operates in high performing schools with complex school 
cultures; and 3) how policymakers’ and school actors’ perceptions of incentives vary. 
In chapter 3 I explain the theoretical frames that I used to explore the connections 
between and processes through which incentives, motivation, performance, and improvement 
unfold in the sociocultural school settings. Experimental research has relied mostly on labor 
economics’ notion that pay has great potential to improve performance. I use theories that get 
closer at culture, context, and behavior in order to assess the claims that undergird incentivism. 
In Chapter 4 I describe the research design that guides this dissertation study. This study 
utilized purposeful sampling in a qualitative case study (Yin, 2003) of teacher merit pay in 
School M1, a high performing elementary school in Shanghai. I collected 21 interviews with 
teachers and administrators in these two schools. Also, I employed a constructivist approach to 
the collection, translation, interpretation, and analysis of the multilingual interview data.  
Chapters 5 highlights key findings on the enactment of PBC policy within a Confucian 
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school culture context, the divergent aims on PBC, and on teacher perceptions of how bonuses 
shape teacher practice. In the final chapter of this dissertation I discuss the implications of these 
findings. I offer implications for policymakers who wish to consider alternative ways to ignite 
improvement in instruction and student learning, research on incentivism, and implications for 
school leaders who face the task of building school culture and enacting school improvement in 
the presence of performance appraisal mandates. 
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CHAPTER 2  
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
In this chapter I review the existing literature on PBC. Descriptive literature has outlined 
recommended, and currently popular, PBC models in P-12 education. Most experimental 
empirical research has investigated the effects of PBC and found bonuses do little to 
substantively improve student and teacher outcomes. Unlike the understudied case of Shanghai, 
England and Wales and the U.S. are well pronounced cases in PBC literature. Gaps in the 
literature include research on how school actors perceive performance incentives, as well as the 
ways in which PBC operates in high performing schools with complex school cultures. I review 
literature on policy design features, popular policy approaches, and the effects of empirical 
literature about performance-pay on teaching and learning. 
Performance-Based Compensation Program Design Components 
Compensation reform includes market-based pay, knowledge and skills-based pay, career 
ladders, recruitment and retention awards, and pay-for-performance (Springer, 2009). Incentives 
are inherent across these approaches, though pay-for-performance typically incentivizes student 
performance in particular. Malen and colleagues (2015) suggested goals, eligibility criteria, 
award characteristics, and award determinants distinguish PBC programs. These characteristics 
are featured in PBC program structure, pay allocation, and performance measures (see Figure 1; 
Odden & Kelley, 1997; OECD, 2009, Podgursky & Springer, 2007a, 2007b; Springer, 2009). 
Program structures. PBCS generally favor absolute performance in fixed contracts over 
relative performance in tournaments. Tournaments award a certain number of top performing 
individuals a predetermined bonus, whereas fixed contracts award bonuses to all individuals who 
meet a performance threshold. For example, in a tournament (i.e., relative performance), the top 
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ten scoring eligible teachers receive 1000 USD, while in a fixed contract (i.e., absolute 
performance), all teachers who meet the performance threshold receive 1000 USD. In the 1980s, 
tournament-based PBCS were shown to create competition and disrupt collaborative ethos and 
are thus often looked upon unfavorably (OECD, 2009). Yet, fixed bonuses are not without their 
own challenges. Collective bargaining negotiators often advocate for the lowest performance 
thresholds possible, thereby maximizing the possibility for high threshold pass rates (Heneman, 
Milanowski & Kimball, 2007). In 2002, for example, England’s first year of Performance 
Management, 97 percent of teachers met the fixed performance threshold (Haynes, Wragg, 
Wragg, & Chamberlin, 2003a, 2003b). High success rates and uncertainty with costs can cause 
taxpayers and the government significant, unforeseen financial burdens. Despite this, fixed 
bonuses are viewed as pragmatic and aligned with teacher culture and thus are preferred. 
Incentives are typically organized around individual, group, or hybrid units. The “free-
rider” problem (i.e., subpar performers benefit equally from high performers’ success) is a grave 
challenge associated with group bonuses. This is one among many reasons economists suggest 
individual incentives are the most likely to improve labor market selection and composition of 
human capital (Lazear, 2003; Podgursky & Springer, 2007). Yet, in the context of education 
critics warn bonuses for individual teachers are complicated by several phenomena: student 
performance is not easily attributable to an individual teacher, individual rewards are antithetical 
to teamwork goals in teaching, the effects of learning are cumulative and build from year to year, 
and non-school factors greatly affect student learning. As a result, hybrid models are quite 
popular. In the U.S., for example, in the Milken Family Foundation’s Teacher Advancement 
Program (TAP), student performance on annual state standardized tests determine bonuses for 
individual teachers and entire schools. A significant challenge associated with hybrid models is 
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that data systems must aggregate and disaggregate data in order to link student performance to 
both individual and groups of teachers.   
Pay allocation. The OECD (2009) offered several illustrative examples of how bonus 
size and distribution vary greatly. Bonus size largely depends on the number of individuals 
expected to receive bonuses. Two popular solutions are to give smaller rewards to more teachers 
or to give larger rewards to fewer teachers. Over time, the sizes of bonuses have increased due to 
greater interest in testing whether larger incentives lead to improved teacher performance 
(Springer, 2009). While size and thresholds vary, distribution typically occurs at the end of the 
school year, in between school years, or at the start of a new school year because often student 
performance tests are administered late in the school year. Research suggests that with regular 
and timely bonus allocations, system gaming behaviors decrease and perceptions of bonuses 
improve (OECD, 2009; Vroom, 1964).  
Performance measures. The measures used to determine performance bonuses are 
perhaps the most widely disputed issue in PBC policy. Some advocate for input-based rewards, 
wherein teachers earn bonuses for participation in instructional improvement activities such as 
professional development, peer mentorship, teacher leadership, and educational advancement 
(Odden & Wallace, 2002). Often referred to as knowledge- and skill-based pay, these measures 
are said to mitigate issues of ‘teaching to the test’ and disproportionate focus on a certain subset 
of students and motivate individuals to focus on self-improvement. Some scholars claim this 
approach is flawed because observable teacher characteristics (e.g., educational attainment, 
certification) explain little of the difference in student achievement (Goldhaber, 2002; Berliner & 
Glass, 2014). 
Measuring teacher quality through student performance. Currently, many PBC policies 
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mandate the use of student performance measures to partially or fully evaluate teachers and/or 
award merit pay (OECD, 2009; Teacher Incentive Fund, 2015). These measures include student 
academic performance, retention, attendance, and advancement (i.e. credit hours or passing 
grades). In the U.S. most states use student achievement data in Value-Added Models (VAMs) 
or growth models (Student Growth Percentiles, SGPs) to evaluate teachers (Race To The Top, 
2011), and in some cases, to award teacher merit pay. Both models are designed to determine the 
portion of student performance on standardized assessments, or the “value-added” score, that is 
attributable to a teacher (Hallinger, Heck, & Murphy, 2014). VAMs typically control for student 
prior history and student- and school-level variables in more complex ways than SGPs (Amrein-
Beardsley, Polasky, & Holloway-Libell, 2016). Because both models typically use largescale 
standardized tests to determine the teacher value-added score, teachers of non-tested grades and 
subject areas are typically ineligible for individual, teacher-level value-added scores. To evaluate 
the performance of teachers in non-tested grades and subjects, states are using teacher-developed 
student learning objectives (SLOs) and benchmark assessments (e.g., Measures of Academic 
Progress) to measure student growth and determine the teacher value-added score. However, 
SLOs and benchmark assessments are not widely recognized as “objective” determinants of 
teacher performance, especially as compared to the largescale standardized assessments, VAMs, 
and SGPs. 
Scholars warn that test-based accountability is a misguided, inappropriate measure to 
evaluate and reward teachers for several reasons. Longstanding research suggests student 
background factors including race, class, and parents’ educational attainment more closely 
determine student achievement than teaching (Ballou & Podgursky, 2003, Berliner & Glass, 
2014; Lubienski & Lubienski, 2014; Rothstein, 2004). Some scholars have found in-school 
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factors, including teaching, only explain 14 percent of student performance (Berliner & Glass, 
2014). Also, teachers, school leaders, itinerant staff, and coaches, who may or may not be 
involved in tested grades or subjects, contribute to student performance. Additionally, 
standardized and interim benchmark test items are biased, particularly against emergent bilingual 
students, students of color, and students from low-income families. Proficiency models implicitly 
encourage teachers to focus on the “bubble kids” in order to move as many students as possible 
across proficiency thresholds, and growth models implicitly encourage focus on the “low kids” 
in order to demonstrate the most amount of growth from as many students as possible (Jennings, 
2012). In some cases, when students show inadequate proficiency or growth, punitive 
consequences are ascribed to teachers, such as public shaming, employment probation, or 
termination (Berliner & Glass, 2014; Orland, 2015). Despite these critiques, student performance 
remains a central measure of PBC. In the next section I review current policy approaches to and 
research on the effects of performance incentives. 
Figure 1. Performance-Based Compensation Programs Design Components 
 
Policy Approaches to Performance-Based Compensation 
Distinctive approaches to PBC are readily visible in the U.S. and parts of the U.K. U.S. 
• Size: Varies and related to performance threshold
• Distribution: Usually at the end of the academic 
year or between academic years 
Pay Allocation
• Value-Added Models
• Knowledge- or Skill-based PayPerformance Measures
• Tournaments
• Fixed performance contracts
• Individual, group, or hybrid units of performance
Program Structure
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PBC is varied and shaped by multiple levels policy, whereas in England and Wales, as of 2013, 
all public school teachers are subject to performance-pay. These countries are the first to tie 
teacher salary progressions entirely to performance metrics.    
England and Wales: A national performance-pay system. In 2000, the England and 
Wales Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) piloted a two-pronged Performance 
Threshold program – Performance Management (PM) and Threshold Assessment (TA; Haynes 
et al., 2003a, 2003b). PM was a teacher appraisal policy, while TA linked teacher performance 
with a 2000 Sterling Pound annual bonus and progression from the standard (i.e., Main Pay 
Scale) to the higher pay scale (i.e., Upper Pay Scale). Policymakers unveiled TA first in an effort 
to immediately award experienced teachers, gain the support of unions and professional 
associations during a critical elections period, improve teacher recruitment and retention, and 
modernize the profession. However, educators perceived the policy as “something for 
something” and an effort to link employment to performance (Mahony, Hextall, & Menter, 
2002). Although the government articulated an inclusive policymaking process, unions and 
associations were not involved in the policy design. Team leaders (i.e., head teachers) and 
external Threshold Assessors (i.e., inspectors) approved 97 percent of 4,753 teachers who 
applied for bonuses. Thereafter, government agencies published an appraisal model to carry out 
PM. Principals assigned a team leader to observe classrooms; hold information discussions; and 
plan, monitor, and review objectives with all teachers regarding about five standards: knowledge 
and understanding, teaching and assessment, pupil progress, wider professional effectiveness, 
and professional characteristics (Haynes et al. 2003a, 2003b; OECD, 2009).  
In 2006, the Performance Threshold system became statutory. It was revised to more 
closely align with new professional standards and career stages and aimed to increase 
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transparency and efficiency in distributing rewards (Evans, 2011). All teachers were required to 
demonstrate proficiency in two stages below the threshold (i.e. Qualified and Core), and they had 
the option to apply to cross the threshold and earn higher salary in three additional stages (i.e., 
Excellent and Advanced). Team leaders and Threshold Assessors determined whether an 
individual crossed the threshold through quantitative markers of student achievement.  
In the 2010 White Paper, The Importance of Teaching, the DfEE announced plans to 
reduce the number of standards, align standards more closely with elements of teaching, and 
more clearly “identify and deal with unsatisfactory performance” (DfEE, 2010 in Evans, 2011). 
As of the 2013-2014 school year, Performance Threshold now includes four key features: 1) 
performance appraisals determine salary progressions for teachers on the Main and Upper Pay 
Scales; 2) educational attainment or years of service no longer determine salary progression; 3) 
salary progression is no longer bound to points or fixed increases, but there are minimum and 
maximum salaries in each scale; and 4) senior colleagues determine teacher performance through 
the teacher standards and progress on the teacher’s previous year objectives as outlined in the 
School Development Plan (i.e., school improvement plan; Coughlan, 2014; Marsden, 2014; 
Ratcliffe, 2013; Walker, 2013). In 2013, this policy affected the approximately 37,000 full-time 
teachers in Wales and 451,000 full-time teachers in England who worked in state-run schools 
(Coughlan, 2014; EWC Annual Statistics Digest, 2014). Since 2010, both regions have increased 
the number of teachers with graduate degrees and with Qualified Teacher Status, but higher 
proportions of teachers have exited each year.  
United States: Merit pay as a way to the top. In contrast, the U.S. has a much longer 
history of experimentation with PBC. The earliest experiments, which were between the World 
Wars and again in the 1980s, (Murnane & Cohen, 1986) were used to create alternatives to the 
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single salary schedule. Leigh (2012) warns that political support for PBC does translate neatly to 
political sustainability. In the U.S., 75 percent of merit pay programs in 1983 were defunct ten 
years later. Since 2006, the U.S. Department of Education’s Teacher Incentive Fund grants (TIF) 
has funded 131 federally funded programs in 2000 schools across 36 states and Washington D.C. 
to “use of performance-based compensation, and other human capital strategies that enhance and 
sustain performance-based compensation, in order to increase students’ access to effective 
educators in high-need schools, and to expand the array of promising approaches that can help 
these educators and other personnel succeed” (Teacher Incentive Fund, 2015).  
PBC is also a cornerstone of the $4.35 billion Race to the Top (RttT) competition. All 19 
RttT states currently have or in the near future will incorporate PBC into compensation policies 
in participating school districts (United States Department of Education, 2015). Minnesota, 
Florida, and Texas together have allocated more than $550 million to performance pay programs 
(Springer & Gardner, 2010). In addition to TIF and RttT funds, states and districts have funded 
PBC through bond and tax increases. Some states keep tight control over district’s compensation 
reforms through state-level per pupil funding. For example, the state of Washington supplies 70 
percent of every district’s funding. The state allocates funding according to its state teacher 
salary schedule and stipulates that states can add on to salaries through one-year contracts that 
stipulate additional work time, additional work responsibilities, and/or incentives.   
Brodsky and colleagues (2010) examined programs in three states – Minnesota, Florida, 
and New Mexico, and in three districts – Denver Public Schools, Austin Independent School 
District, and Houston Independent School District – and found variance in program structure, 
performance measures, and pay allocation (see Table 3). Founded in 1999 and the oldest of the 
six program, Denver’s veteran teachers who opt to participate in PBC remain in the performance 
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pay program for his/her entire career in the district. However, new teachers must participate in 
the program. In Houston and Florida, student performance on annual standardized tests solely 
determines incentive pay; whereas in Minnesota, New Mexico, and Denver, student 
performance, teacher knowledge/skills, and supervisor evaluations jointly determine 
performance pay. Austin and Denver offer incentives to teachers who work in hard-to-teach/staff 
subjects and schools. Intermediary organizations (e.g., advocacy organizations, foundations, 
think tanks) have participated in the conceptual, programmatic, and fiscal development of each 
program. Bonus allocations vary greatly from $1000 to $5000 per teacher per school year, which 
represents between two to five percent of the average U.S. teacher’s annual salary. 
Policymakers have not found a neat solution to offer performance-pay to teachers who 
teach in untested grades and/or subjects. The fine arts are a prominent example. Elpus (2011) 
cites three key problems with PBC for arts teachers: a) the “high quality teacher” definition is 
vague, especially as “high quality teacher” is increasingly determined by quantitative measures 
of student performance; b) evaluation of the “high quality” arts teacher in the arts is also vague, 
and c) there are inequities in access to merit pay. For example, in Washington D.C. and Denver 
school districts, arts teachers are not privy to the same amount of bonus pay as teachers of 
reading and math (Elpus, 2011). 
Effects of Performance Incentives 
Several decades of research have examined the effects of PBC on student and teacher 
outcomes. Experimental data on the effects of PBC are mixed, and overall, merit pay claims rest 
upon weak empirical support. Schools adopt performance incentives primarily through group-
based programs. In rare instances, incentives have yielded slight, positive student and teacher 
outcomes in the U.S., Israel, India, and other OECD nations. Yet, longer-term effects are 
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unknown because these programs have not persisted over time.  
Experimental Evidence on Student Outcomes 
Famed author on human motivation, Daniel Pink, summarized the performance of 
financial bonuses across disciplines:  
Here’s what science knows: 1) Those 20th century rewards, those motivators we think are 
the natural part of business do work, but only in a surprisingly narrow band of 
circumstances; 2) those if-then rewards often destroy creativity; 3) the secret to high 
performance isn’t rewards and punishments but that unseen intrinsic drive – the drive to 
do things for their own sake, the drive to do things cuz [sic] they matter (TedGlobal, July 
2009) 
 
 The bulk of experimental research has examined U.S. program outcomes; but some data 
have looked at program effects in other regions such as Kenya, India, and Israel (see Table 1). 
Mathematica Policy Institute’s evaluation of U.S. 2010 Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) districts’ 
PBCS found that just half of all districts implemented all four required program components, 65 
percent of districts reported sustainability was a challenge, and many districts reported PBC was 
organized in that did not yield successful implementation (Chiang, Wellington, Hallgren, 
Speroni, Herrmann, Glazerman, & Constantine, 2015). Teachers who were part of the ten 
districts that participated in a sub-randomized control trial reported limited understanding of the 
program, their eligibility, and reward potential. In these ten districts, students in the treatment 
group showed a slightly positive improvement in reading but no statistically significant 
improvement in math.  
Studies of PBCS in New York City and in Austin, Texas have found either slight or no 
effect on student performance (Balch & Springer, 2015; Marsh, Springer, McCaffrey, Yuan, & 
Epstein, 2011). One study of the 2007 New York City group-based PBCS found, “in schools 
where smaller groups of teachers were responsible for instructing tested students, the program 
led to small but significant increases in student achievement” (Goodman & Turner, 2013, p. 
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410). The authors suggested linking pay to school-wide performance goals, the presence of a 
parallel accountability system that sanctioned schools that did not meet the same goals that were 
used to determined bonuses, and teachers’ lack of understanding about the PBCS limited 
program effectiveness. Sojourner and colleagues’ (2014) analysis of Minnesota’s Quality 
Compensation (QComp) program found a slight increase in achievement for students whose 
teachers were less experienced. In their comparison of a traditional and performance-pay 
compensation systems, Eberts and colleagues (2002) found performance pay increased high 
school students’ course completion, did not affect grade point average, and negatively affected 
student attendance and passing rates. Some scholars have experimental studies’ methodological 
weaknesses. Lavy (2007) discounted findings on the PBCS in North Carolina, Kentucky, and 
Texas for not having control groups, weak comparison groups, and voluntary teacher 
participation. In his review of PBC literature, Leigh (2012) called for longitudinal studies of 
well-established programs that use a mix of methods.  
Survey Data On Teacher Outcomes  
 Survey research have provided insights into teacher support for merit pay. Matthes and 
Tollerud’s (1990) survey found 247 teachers generally did not support career ladder and merit 
pay concepts. Women were particularly opposed to peer evaluation in bonus programs, and 
elementary teachers and teachers with less postsecondary education responded less favorably to 
incentives and competition-based compensation. National survey data from the U.S. in 1987 
suggested private school teachers supported performance pay more than public school teachers 
(Podgursky and Springer, 2007a). Muralidharan and Sundararaman’s (2011) survey found the 
majority of U.S. teachers (86 percent) had favorable views toward merit pay, while most U.K. 
teachers disagreed with the principles of merit pay and using student performance measures to 
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allocate merit pay.  
Goldhaber and colleagues (2008) analysis of 1999-2000 School and Staffing Survey data 
found that districts in states with stronger accountability policies, Right to Work laws, and no 
collective bargaining were more likely to have PBC programs. They also found teacher total 
income in merit pay districts was about $621 more than teacher total income in nonmerit pay 
districts. Approximately 55 percent of surveyed teachers favored merit pay, 12 percent of the 
schools surveyed used PBC, and ten percent of teachers in these schools received merit pay. 
Teachers in cities and teachers in private schools were more supportive of merit pay than 
teachers who worked elsewhere or worked in public schools. Teachers with more experience, 
women, Whites, those in rural communities, those who believed evaluations in one’s schools 
were not fair were more likely to oppose merit pay. Also, teacher support was not related to 
school size, student socioeconomic status, or teacher base salary.  
In their analysis of 2006 Washington State Teacher Compensation survey data, 
Goldhaber and colleagues (2011) found teacher self-interest and sense of professional norms of 
collegiality mediated perceptions of compensation reform. Teachers who expressed high trust 
and respect for their colleagues, females, teachers with many years of experience, Whites, 
elementary school teachers, and teachers who identified as members of unions expressed low 
support for PBC. Teachers of students from low-income families supported merit pay more than 
other teachers, math and science teachers supported subject-area bonuses, and the mean “fair” 
amount for a subject-area bonus was $2,331. The authors concluded, “competitive rewards more 
so than other compensating differentials may be at odds with strongly held professional norms in 
teaching;” (p. 454) and to reduce the “hard blow at the egalitarian ethos of the profession,” (p. 
460) districts should allow voluntary participation for veteran teachers and mandate new teacher 
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participation in PBCS (i.e., the Denver, Colorado approach). In their analysis of several 
longitudinal studies, Podgursky and Springer (2007b) concluded, “a growing body of research 
points to large but idiosyncratic teacher effects” (p. 570). Like other scholars, they reported merit 
pay has neither provoked modifications to teacher instruction nor increased teacher effort 
(Matthes & Tollerud, 1990; Elliot & Hout, 2011).  
Case Studies 
Case studies have explored the processes and character of PBC in schools. Though few, 
these studies offer rich insight into how PBC shapes teachers’ perceptions of pay, school culture, 
and organizational improvement. Kelley and colleagues (2000) examined the organizational 
structure of, and educators’ perspectives, on the Maryland and Kentucky PBCSs. Mandated by 
the State Supreme Court, Kentucky’s PBCS made clear how performance and merit were tied 
together, and teachers had discretion over how to spend their money. In contrast, the Maryland 
system had weak, vague sanctions, and schools were required to spend group bonuses entirely on 
school improvement. About 40 percent of Kentucky schools received rewards, whereas about 10 
percent of Maryland schools received rewards. The 1996-1997 interview and survey data showed 
Kentucky teachers understood their state’s accountability system and PBC policies more than 
Maryland teachers. The Kentucky program yielded teaching improvements, despite negative 
reactions from principals and teachers. While the Maryland PBCS did not generate strong 
teacher and school improvement, principals reported more flexibility and comparatively less 
stress and pressure. The authors concluded a key issue to be explored was, “How much 
accountability is enough to strengthen teacher collaboration while not undermining the personal 
well-being of teachers?” (p. 193). 
Studies of Maryland’s Prince George’s County Public Schools (PGCPS), the 18th largest 
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district in the U.S. with 130,000 diverse students, have shed further light into how PBC unfolds 
in schools. The district selected 42 high needs schools to participate in a program that used 
student growth (50 percent of total score for teachers and 60 percent for principals), 
skills/knowledge growth, and hard-to staff/teach areas to determine merit pay (Malen et al., 
2015). In an analysis of interviews with 144 district personnel and 24 leaders, Rice and 
colleagues (2012) found that as leaders and teachers became increasingly overwhelmed with 
program demands, their support waned, stress increased, and they gained concern with the 
“legitimacy and helpfulness of the evaluations and the fairness of the evaluation process” (p. 
923). Rice and colleagues (2015) also found issues of fairness abounded. Teachers expected 
maximum award amounts to be attainable, performance measures to be accurate and reliable, and 
eligibility restrictions justified, and merit pay allocation rules clear from the outset.  
The 2006-2010 PBCS in 15 schools in Austin, Texas, also used multiple metrics to 
determine merit pay. Performance measures included veteran-to-novice teacher mentorship, 
classroom level student growth assessment, and schoolwide student growth assessment through 
statewide peer comparisons. Mentor teachers received $5,500 for mentorship and up to $4,000 in 
performance-based pay. Teachers received $1,000 to $3,000 for achieving SLOs and $2,000 to 
$4,000 for schoolwide growth, and principals received $4,000 to $8,000 for campus-wide 
growth. Austin school district leaders Lussier and Forgione (2010), reported that an internal 
evaluation found 67 percent of teachers reported the program to be fair and supported student 
growth measures, and 89 percent of teachers deemed student growth on state standardized tests 
moderately or highly important. The program was cut because of financial constraints and the 
Board’s position that there was a “lack of compelling evidence that [the program] was having a 
meaningful impact on campuses,” and there was a “lack of national data that incentive-based 
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programs have had a sustainable impact on school and district performance” (p. 240).  
Research on the Kentucky, Maryland, and Texas programs echoed challenges with 
organizational issues and capacity development, two pronounced issues in PBC implementation 
literature (Kelley, Conley, & Kimball, 2000; Raham, 2000). Malen and colleagues (2015) 
discussed how these grave challenges largely shape “partial and symbolic” implementation:  
As prized resources such as time, energy, and talent get dispersed across a growing 
number of distinct programs, capacity is diluted. In short, new policies and programs can 
make organizations and the individuals who work in them more fragmented and frenetic 
rather than more effective and efficient. Under these conditions, even when individuals 
exert extraordinary effort, programs may wind up being only partially or symbolically 
implemented. (p. 168) 
 
As PBC scales up, capacity, sustainability, and perceptions of fairness remain key concerns. 
England and Wales. England and Wales adopted system-wide merit pay programs that 
tie public school teacher salary entirely to performance metrics (Haynes et al., 2003a, 2003b). 
Performance appraisals determine salary progressions for teachers, educational attainment or 
years of service do not determine salary progression, salary progression is not bound to fixed 
increases, and senior colleagues determine teacher performance through standards and growth 
comparisons (Evans, 2011; Marsden, 2014; Ratcliffe, 2013; Walker, 2013). In its first year in 
2013, this policy affected the approximately 37,000 full-time teachers in Wales and 451,000 full-
time teachers in England who worked in state-run schools, and 97 percent of teachers who 
applied for bonuses were approved (Coughlan, 2014; EWC Annual Statistics Digest, 2014). Both 
countries have increased the number of teachers with graduate degrees and with Qualified 
Teacher Status, but higher proportions of teachers have exited each year (Coughlan, 2014).  
Scholars reported that education authorities in these countries saw PBC as a vehicle to 
award experienced teachers, gain the support of unions and professional associations during a 
critical elections period, improve teacher recruitment and retention, and modernize the 
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profession. Educators saw the policy as “something for something” and an effort to link 
employment to performance (Mahony et al., 2002). Haynes and colleagues’ (2003b) reported 
that teachers and headteachers, who are the Threshold Assessors (TA; i.e., the person who 
determined merit pay decisions), were concerned about fairness, legitimacy, and capacity for 
strong implementation given that they lacked funding, training, and agreed upon criteria. Haynes 
and colleagues (2003a) also found the majority of teachers felt like “victims of bias and 
management bullying” (p. 43) and were concerned with the TAs’ power, fairness, and 
inconsistency with evaluations and communication. Teachers interpreted TAs’ behavior as a 
signal that TAs wanted “unsuccessful” teachers to leave the school. These perceptions appeared 
to have influenced underperforming teachers’ employment decisions, as 29 percent intended to 
work in a different school, 50 percent had already left their schools, and 33 percent planned to 
leave the teaching profession. In a separate study, Mahony and colleagues (2002) found TAs’ 
views of PBC were positive, but teachers’ views varied but both groups were concerned about 
implementation and sustainability. A union affiliate predicted, “schools will only have the cash 
to allow fewer than one in two teachers who have passed the threshold to progress further up the 
pay scale” (TES, 14 December 2001 in Mahony et al., 2002). Storey’s (2000) analysis of over 
4,000 written responses to the government’s PBC policy announcement from unions, 
policymakers, teachers, parents, and advocacy groups found that stakeholders feared and 
distrusted the PBCS. Storey (2000) explained why an absence of trust bears negative 
consequences for teacher improvement:  
Trust is viewed as a prime conditioning factor in the literature relating to motivation. It is 
seen as a form of `social capital’ a crucial organizational resource or capability, which 
can give one organization an advantage over others, even those which ostensibly have 
similar or even the same pay scheme. Trust can be seen as part of the psychological 
contract. It is part of the sense of fairness at work, which is a mediating factor and which 
can allow or disable all types of human resource initiatives (p. 521). 
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Case studies of merit pay tend to divulge several key findings. Self-interest and complex, 
multidimensional conceptions of fairness and justice may contribute to the feasibility of opt-in 
merit-pay schemes. Qualitative examinations of well-established PBCS are needed in order to 
assess whether and how incentive pay is altering the teaching workforce, a central tenet of the 
policy (Rice et al., 2015). Furthermore, instruments that identify measures of teacher cognitive 
skills are needed to better understand the relationship between performance pay, teacher skills, 
and student achievement (Cissel, 2010). Similarly, Neal (2009) suggested proxies of teacher 
quality must be clearly defined in order to reward teacher quality and ensure bonuses are given to 
“the types of achievement that the system is intended to foster,” (p. 155).  
Discussion 
The empirical literature tends toward several key findings. Schools have adopted PBC 
primarily through group-based incentive programs. There are rare instances in which incentives 
have yielded slight, positive student and teacher outcomes in the U.S., Israel, India, and other 
OECD nations, but because these programs have not persisted over time, research has not studied 
the longer-term effects. Contemporary case studies suggest self-interest and complex, 
multidimensional conceptions of fairness and justice may contribute to the feasibility of opt-in 
merit-pay schemes.  
Survey findings on teacher support for merit pay are contradictory, especially on the 
patterns of support from teachers work in schools with high populations of students from low-
income families. Teachers seem to favor group-based incentive plans, but we know little about 
what aspects of and under what conditions incentives are attractive. Overall, teachers respond 
unfavorably to PBC and suggest that programs that base bonuses exclusively, or mostly, upon 
student performance measures negatively affect collaboration, trust, respect, and capacity to 
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learn. Leigh (2012) reviewed teacher perceptions as follows: 
First, teachers have real concerns about the impact of merit pay, particularly on the 
cooperative spirit in the school. Second, there is significant heterogeneity in attitudes, 
with new hires and minority teachers substantially more inclined to support merit pay. 
Third, the kind of merit-pay plan that receives least support is one that uses test scores… 
On average, the kinds of test-based merit-pay schemes generally favored by economists 
receive little support among the teaching profession. However, there is enough 
heterogeneity in teacher attitudes that opt-in merit-pay schemes may be feasible. (p. 20-
26) 
 
Research has mostly focused on student outcomes in Western countries. We know little 
about incentives in high performing education systems are influential in global education 
accountability and reform, such as Shanghai. Longitudinal studies of large incentive programs 
offer deeper, more nuanced understandings of the effects of incentives on students, teachers, and 
schools. In terms of teachers and teaching and school leaders and leadership, rigorous research of 
new and existing programs must examine how bonus pay affects professional learning 
communities; instruction, curriculum, and assessment decisions; and the professional behavior of 
teacher and leaders. In doing so, research can begin to describe whether and how incentive pay is 
altering the teaching workforce, a central tenet of the policy (Rice et al., 2015). Cissel (2010) 
suggested future research identify measures of teacher cognitive skills to better understand the 
relationship between performance pay, teacher skills, and student achievement. Similarly, Neal 
(2009) suggested proxies of teacher quality must be clearly defined in order to reward teacher 
quality, and PBC programs align measures and procedures that ensure bonuses are given to “the 
types of achievement that the system is intended to foster,” (p. 155).   
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter, I describe the theoretical frames used in this study. Previous studies have 
relied primarily on concepts from labor economics, such as agency theory, to study incentivism. 
This approach has been unable to capture how incentives operate and the process through which 
their consequences unfold in complex school settings. These foci are key to judging the strength 
of the bedrock assumption of performance incentives: bonuses lead to improved motivation, 
teacher performance, student performance, and school markets. Because incentivism works 
through the perceptions of school leaders and teachers and is shaped by school culture, we need 
theoretical tools that place culture and behavior in the forefront. Therefore, I integrate insights 
from behavioral psychology, such as expectancy and goal attainment theory, with insights from 
school culture and Confucianism to understand how bonus policies unfolded in the School M1. 
Also, I use a strategic-relational view on the role of ideas (Verger, 2014) and policy enactment 
(Ball, Maguire, & Braun, 2012) to examine the policy structure and how it unfolded. 
Confucian School Culture 
Schooling – and thereby teaching and learning – is a social, cultural, and a political 
enterprise. Policies featured in standardization and incentivism, that are targeted at teacher 
improvement, are situated in the social, cultural, and political underpinnings of schools (Bryk & 
Schneider, 2002). To examine the prevailing hypothesis – there is a neat, positive relationship 
between a financial incentive, teaching, and student achievement – it is imperative to view 
performance-based compensation as deeply embedded in the fabric of school culture. The culture 
of School M1 and other Shanghai schools represents a confluence of teaching and learning and 
national culture. Theoretical tools on school and Confucian culture provide the multifocal frame 
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necessary to understand the enactment of incentivism in School M1.    
The culture of a school is marked by the values and beliefs held by school members, 
traditions that persist over time (Higgins-D’Alessandro & Sadh 1997). Scholars have suggested 
that the core values and beliefs of a school culture are exemplified by the rules, celebrations, 
traditions, and routines of members of the school community (Robbiens & Alvy, 2004). Gruenert 
and Whitaker (2015) added that culture is “both a survival mechanism and a framework for 
solving problems” (p. 4). The earliest sociological thinking suggested culture “is not a problem 
that needs to be solved, but rather a framework that a group can use to solve problems; it is how 
we learn to survive, one generation passing down what it has learned to the next” (p. 6). Schein 
(1992) saw culture as a set of unwritten rules that defined a particular group, and Geertz (1973) 
saw culture as an interpretative science. Trice and Beyer (1993) explained cultural innovation as 
more difficult than cultural maintenance. Waller (1932, in Deal & Peterson, 2016) underscored 
the tension of tradition and innovation: 
Schools have a culture that is definitely their own. There are, in the school, complex 
rituals of personal relationships, a set of folkways, mores, and irrational sanctions, a 
moral code based upon them. There are games, which are sublimated wars, teams, and an 
elaborate set of ceremonies concerning them. There are traditions and traditionalists 
waging their world-old battle against innovators” (p. 7) 
 
Hofstede’s (1983, 1991, 2001) research has examined how workplace values are 
influenced by culture. His research in 76 countries found compensation systems were a function 
of six dimensions of national culture: power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty, 
long term orientation, and indulgence. Also referred to as Confucian dynamism, long-term 
orientation is marked by persistence, perseverance, ordering relationships by status, the 
possibility of having many truths, thrift, and having a sense of shame (Hofstede & Minkov, 
2010). Bozionelos and Wang (2007) explain long-term orientation as “the extent to which a 
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particular society espouses the values introduced by the moral philosopher Confucius who lived 
around the 5thc century BC.” In their research on identity in the Chinese workplace, Bozionelos 
and Wang (2007) found China placed significantly higher than the Anglo-Saxon countries on 
Hofstede’s dimensions of collectivism and long-term orientation. Their research underscored the 
influence of Confucian values on Chinese work culture: 
The teachings of Confucius have largely influenced the shaping of the Chinese culture 
(Tung, 1996). One of the pivotal Confucian principles, which shares common ground 
with collectivism, pertains to the importance of the group and points to the fact that 
individuals must submit themselves to the needs of the group. Hence, the maintenance of 
cohesion and harmonious relationships within the work group must be a dominant 
concern for the Chinese in the workplace. (p. 286) 
 
Confucianism holds a very particular view on fairness: “Equality for all within the same 
group, and equity for those outside the group. The latter is reflected by a Confucian aphorism 
saying that there is no worry about scarcity but unevenness (Huang, 1997)” (Fong & Shaffer, 
2003, p. 564). Goh and colleagues (2009) suggested East Asia Confucianism and 
communitarianism are taught through formal education, stories, and religious practices. They 
characterized teachers with Confucian values as “sociocentric, holistic, allocentric, ensembled, 
constitutive, contextualist, high-context, connected and relational, conservatist, self-
transcedent..., interconnected, and depend on each other for self-definition” (p. 260). It is also 
well documented that Confucian cultures have historically held teachers and schools especially 
accountable for student learning (Williams & Engel, 2012).  
Policy Enactment 
Policy enactment offers a framework to illuminate the character of the Confucian context 
of school culture in School M1 and the ways in which teacher accountability policies, such as 
Performance-Based Compensation, interact with this unique culture. Unlike policy 
implementation, policy enactment focuses squarely on the discursive processes, interpretations, 
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and decoding of policy that is “done by and done to teachers” (Ball, Maguire, & Braun, 2012, p. 
3). Ball and colleagues (2012) explain enactments are “collective and collaborative…in the 
interaction and inter-connection between diverse actors, texts, talk, technology and objects 
(artefacts) which constitute ongoing responses to policy…in our schools [policy] is always a 
process of ‘becoming’, changing from the outside in and the inside out” (p. 4). To make sense of 
how teachers perceive and take up PBC in School M1, enactment allows a look at the 
interpretation and translation of actors at multiple levels. By focusing explicitly on context, 
enactment calls for an explicit focus on the school-specific factors, micro-institutional variables, 
and the external environments that are “situated, material, professional, and external dimensions” 
of policy actions (Braun, Ball, Maguire, & Hoskins, 2011).  
Strategic-Relational View on the Role of Ideas 
The key idea in the adoption of PBC policy is the economic, rational conceptualization of 
incentivism, which suggests financial bonuses lead to optimal performance. Verger’s (2014) 
strategic-relational view of the role of ideas in policy adoption in GEP is a useful tool to study 
this idea and how it is operationalized the stated and perceived aims of PBC. Verger (2014) 
asserted a focus on the multifaceted role of ideas in GEP affords a complex interpretation of 
policy adoption:  
…Paying closer attention to the multiple roles of ideas in GEP processes and, 
specifically, to their application in dynamics of policy adoption can contribute to 
unraveling the macro vs. the micro, convergence vs. divergence, local vs. global and 
related dichotomies that so often stretch the globalization debate in comparative 
education (cf. Chisholm, 2012; Robertson, 2012)…[Ideas] need to be understood as 
constitutive of broader structures and institutions…with causal powers over actors’ 
preferences and decisions. In other words, ideas can operate as both structure and agency, 
action and condition. (p. 24) 
 
Departing from a constructivist view that focuses on the action and condition aspects of 
ideas, Verger’s strategic-relational approach calls for a “dialectical understanding of the 
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relationship between ideas, institutional change, and strategically selective contexts” (p. 20). The 
interweaving of ideas, institutions, and contexts illuminates the adoption patterns that occur 
when policy advocates weave core policy ideas into existing institutional frameworks and 
prevailing policy and political norms. One strategic selectivity that is particularly relevant to 
adoption of incentivist policies is government ideology. Verger explains, “policy-makers are 
more inclined to adopt policy solutions that fit within the ideology of the government for which 
they work or that they represent…Governmental ideologies represent a key filter when it comes 
to adopting OECD recommendations on educational policy” (p. 21). This influence of ideas is 
also embedded in Verger, Lubienski, and Steiner-Khamsi’s (2016) characterization of the global 
education industry (GEI) as a social field of networks, cognitive frames, and institutions:  
Networks refer to the more or less stable sets of relationships between political, social 
and/or economic actors, which work as channels of influence and, in many cases, as more 
or less formal governance mechanisms.  Cognitive frames refer to the types of ideas that 
social, political and economic actors mobilize to advance their vision of societal 
problems and preferred solutions. And institutions can be broadly defined as sets of rules, 
norms and procedures in which actors develop their economic activity and their political 
strategies (p. 14) 
 
Cognitive frames mobilize policy actors to advance their given policy solutions within 
institutional and regulatory norms and among networks of a variety of policy actors.  
Incentivism: What’s The Big Idea? 
 
The cognitive frame of incentivism is readily apparent in the social field of GEP. PBC 
has been advanced under the persuasion that it meets the demands of globalization, competition, 
and innovation, and technology advances that enable measurement of individual performance 
(Xiu & Gunderson, 2013). This labor economics principle of agency suggests monetary, explicit 
incentives, rather than “fuzzy,” social extrinsic motivators (e.g., fear of termination, popularity, 
respect), motivate individuals to expend their maximum effort and behave in ways that lead to 
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optimal performance (Kreps, 1997; Weiner, 1980). The policy has been widely adopted in 
human resources practices in the private sector. Most of the Fortune 1000 firms use PBC 
(Luthans & Stajkovic, 1999) in forms such as profit sharing, efficiency wages, and firm size-
based pay to employees who demonstrate strong sales and leadership (Baker, Jenson, & Murphy, 
1988). ‘Best practice’ suggests PBC be derived through a combination of decentralized 
managerial wage discretion and a competitive production environment (Xu, 2000). Also, 
economists argue rather than focusing on the “irrelevant and uneconomic” relationship between 
incentives and motivation and orchestrators must consider the level (i.e., the total cost of a 
package for an employer or the total value of a package to an employee), functional form (i.e., 
the performance incentives), and composition (i.e., the relative amounts of the discrete 
components of the package such as cash, retirement benefits, travel reimbursement) of PBC 
design (Baker et al., 1988; Earn, 1982). This view asserts that functional form is particularly 
important because it bears directly upon the level at which employees value packages (Baker et 
al., 1998).  
In GEP, incentivist ideas have been orchestrated among policy actors at multiple levels 
toward the adoption of vouchers and parent trigger laws in the US (Lubienski, Brewer, La 
Londe, 2015). Some scholars have warned that the result of the competition of ideas and interests 
in democratic arenas and institutions may result in the privatization of public policymaking 
(Lubienski et al., 2015), as evidenced by idea orchestration toward vouchers, parent trigger laws, 
and charter schools in, for example, the state of Washington (see Au & Lubienski, 2016). Similar 
to vouchers and parent trigger laws, the orchestration of PBC has invoked ideas around market 
competition. Yet here we see a particular focus on individual teachers as a ‘front-line workers’ 
(OECD, 2014) who are the best mechanisms to improve educational markets. Vagi (2014) 
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explained, “by rewarding effective teachers and providing them with opportunities to earn 
salaries comparable to those in other fields, advocates argue that more highly qualified 
candidates will be drawn to the profession as less effective teachers are forced to leave” (p. 99). 
In other words, advocates suggest over time incentives will provoke strong teachers to join and 
stay and weak teachers to leave the field (Hanushek & Lindseth, 2009). When teachers (i.e. 
agents) exert their maximum efforts, school districts (i.e. principals) needs are fulfilled and 
“moral hazards” are reduced (Goldhaber, DeArmond, Player, & Choi, 2008). Because districts 
can offer attractive compensation, they can retain effective teachers, differentiate effectiveness, 
and thus increase the average level of teacher effectiveness (Leigh, 2012). Additionally, pay 
equalizing practices, such as the single salary schedule, reduce the overall performance, 
attractiveness, and effectiveness of the education labor force and creates high opportunity costs 
for uniquely skilled people to enter the teaching labor market (Goldhaber, DeArmond, & 
Deburgomaster, 2011, Podgursky & Springer, 2007b). Lazear (2003) makes clear that even if 
incentive effects are not strong (i.e., merit pay fails to improve teacher and/or student outcomes), 
positive selection effects will eventually lead to improved schools. In addition, non-
governmental organizations and governments in developing countries suggest incentives can 
improve exceptionally low teacher salaries, overrepresentation of women, and teacher shortages. 
Overall, advocates suggest PBC fulfills three key aims: it alters the labor force, maximizes the 
labor force’s effort/performance, and thereby bolsters educator quality, school quality, and 
education markets (Lubienski, Scott, & DeBray, 2011). 
The role of ideas in GEP reform affords a more nuanced understanding of the structures 
and institutions that enable the adoption of PBC. It is already well documented that policy actors’ 
aims often differ from teachers’ perceptions of policies targeted at their improvement. 
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Acknowledging and outlining the differences between policy actors’ and teachers’ perceptions 
on various education reforms helps illuminate global perspectives on high stakes teacher 
accountability policies. But by tracing these perspectives from the vantage point of the nexus of 
ideas and institutional change in the Shanghai context, I consider the purchase of the currently 
fashionable cognitive frames that persuade policy actors to incentivize and monetize teacher 
performance and worth. 
Agency, Expectancy, and Goals 
Since the 1960s, scholars have explored the relationships between pay, financial 
incentives, motivation, and quality of output. While economic perspectives focus on 
performance, behavioral perspectives focus on behavior. Economists have drawn upon agency 
theory to explain that extrinsic rewards extract maximum and optimal human performance. 
Behaviorists, however, have used theoretical tools on expectancy and goal setting to examine the 
exact behaviors that link incentives and performance. The focus on behavior is key to fully 
explore how incentives, motivation, performance, and improvement unfold in school settings. 
Together, these conceptualizations of incentives offer a robust way to consider teachers’ 
perceptions of how bonuses shape their practice.  
Extrinsic Incentives Lead to Optimal Performance  
The economic principle of agency suggests monetary, explicit incentives, rather than 
“fuzzy,” social extrinsic motivators (e.g., fear of termination, popularity, respect), motivate 
individuals to expend their maximum effort and behave in ways that lead to optimal performance 
(Kreps, 1997; Weiner, 1980). Economists further note that the relationship between incentives 
and human motivation is both irrelevant and uneconomic. Instead, of greater concern is the scope 
and design of incentive programs (Baker et al., 1988; Earn, 1982). Level (i.e., the total cost of a 
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package for an employer or the total value of a package to an employee), functional form (i.e., 
the performance incentives), and composition (i.e., the relative amounts of the discrete 
components of the package such as cash, retirement benefits, travel reimbursement) are three key 
issues that labor economists suggest are vital to promising performance-pay schemes. Functional 
form is particularly important because it bears directly upon the level at which employees value 
packages (Baker et al., 1998).  
Goldhaber and colleagues (2008) framed the rarely used principal-agent relationship in 
the context of incentives in education and acknowledge the main challenge is school districts 
(i.e., principals), do not know enough about teachers’ (i.e., agents) work to create an incentive 
scheme that yields maximum payoffs.  
…The central problem for the principal is to structure an incentive scheme that will 
persuade the agent to act according to the principal's aims so that the principal's expected 
utility of the payoff is maximized (Dixit, 2002; Laffont and Martimort, 2002). Though 
rarely used in education, principal-agent theory offers insight into why a school district 
would choose to offer merit pay or not. Districts, like most employers, face a moral 
hazard problem: they have less information about the work teachers do than teachers 
have themselves. Principal-agent theory considers relationships in which one actor (the 
principal) wants another actor (the agent) to act on his or her behalf. The relationship 
represents a contracting problem in which the principal must pay for the agent's effort, 
which produces an outcome that affects the principal's payoff.  
 
Using a principal-agent perspective to model merit pay in school districts, the authors conclude 
districts are less likely to offer merit pay when the political costs of implementation are high, 
districts are more likely to offer merit pay when there is more performance information about 
teachers, and teacher pay will likely be higher in districts with merit pay than in those without 
merit pay.  
Advocates also suggest when districts offer attractive compensation, they can retain 
effective teachers, differentiate effectiveness, and thus increase the average level of teacher 
effectiveness (Leigh, 2012). Vagi (2014) explained, “by rewarding effective teachers and 
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providing them with opportunities to earn salaries comparable to those in other fields, advocates 
argue that more highly qualified candidates will be drawn to the profession as less effective 
teachers are forced to leave” (p. 99). Additionally, pay equalizing practices, such as the single 
salary schedule, reduce the overall performance, attractiveness, and effectiveness of the 
education labor force and creates high opportunity costs for uniquely skilled people to enter the 
teaching labor market (Goldhaber et al., 2011; Podgursky & Springer, 2007b). Lazear (2003) 
asserted that even if incentive effects are not strong (i.e., merit pay fails to improve teacher 
and/or student outcomes), positive selection effects will eventually lead to improved schools. In 
addition, non-governmental organizations and governments in developing countries suggest 
incentives can improve exceptionally low teacher salaries, overrepresentation of women, and 
teacher shortages (Kobakhidze, 2010). Overall, advocates suggest PBC alters the labor force, 
maximizes the labor force’s effort/performance, and thereby bolster educator quality, school 
quality, and education markets (Lubienski et al., 2011). 
Perspectives of Pay Matter 
Focusing on the individual behavior that links rewards and performance, behavioral 
perspectives add further depth to economists’ reward-performance thesis. Early behaviorists 
attempted to disentangle the effects of financial rewards upon intrinsic motivation from the effect 
of financial rewards upon performance outputs (Weiner, 1980). Since the 1960s, when 
behaviorists first reported financial incentives decreased intrinsic motivation and creativity, no 
experimental evidence has found merit pay to positively impact intrinsic motivation (Weiner, 
1980). This research also uncovered a number of concerns associated with merit pay including 
narrowing of task focus, disproportionate focus on quick results, aversion to risk-taking, erosion 
of intrinsic motivation, and the feeling of being controlled by a reward (Kohn in Baker et al., 
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1998). Behaviorists have suggested supervisor feedback, perceptions of pay, pay satisfaction, 
and trust all mediate intrinsic motivation (Lawler, 1983, Luthans & Stajkovic, 1999), and 
employee participate in compensation design in one way to decrease information asymmetry and 
increase employees’ sense of control (Lawler, 1976).  
Expectancy and goal setting are two particular behavioral theories used in recent studies 
of performance incentives in education. Expectancy theory provides a lens through which one 
can examine the potency of incentives to lead to improved or desirable behaviors. This 
framework suggests an individual’s perspectives of expectancy (i.e., effort leads to reward), 
instrumentality (i.e., performance leads to reward), valence (i.e., attractiveness of the expected 
rewards), are key factors that drive motivation (Heneman, 1998; Vroom, 1964). Recent research 
finds school leaders’ perceptions of expectancy and instrumentality influence where they allocate 
their effort (e.g., professional development, content, teaching methods), and school leaders’ 
perceptions of valence influence school improvement agendas (Kelley et al., 2000). Also Rice 
and colleagues (2015) found perceptions of different aspects of fairness (i.e., procedural, 
substantive, and distributional) shape expectancy, instrumentality, and valence. Goal setting 
theory suggests factors of fairness and goal attainability also mediate individual motivation and 
capacity for improved or desirable performance (Bryan & Locke, 1967; Locke & Latham, 2006). 
In their use of goal setting and expectancy theories in their analysis of a performance-pay 
program, Rice and colleagues (2015) explained: 
Taken together, studies drawing on these two theories suggest that (a) awards must have 
high valence, meaning they must be salient and sizable enough to appeal to teachers; (b) 
awards must address expectancy and instrumentality (i.e., attainability) by demonstrating 
understandable and credible connections between work, performance, and reward; and (c) 
goals, measures, and awards must be perceived as fair (p. 30) 
 
 
   40 
CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study addressed how merit pay was perceived, functioned, and shaped teaching in 
Shanghai. In this chapter I describe my constructivist approach to this multilingual, multisite 
qualitative case study. I also describe in detail the research questions and corresponding data 
collection and analysis procedures summarized in the below table. I also explain the translation 
procedures that I employed in my analysis of interview data, and I identify the limitations and 
strengths of this study.  
Table 1. Overview of Research Questions and Methodological Approach 
Research Questions Data Collected Analytic Methods 
1) How do the stated and perceived aims of performance-based compensation (PBC) vary?  
1a) What are city, district, and school 
policymakers’ stated aims of PBC? 
1b) What are teachers’ perceptions of the aims 
of PBC? 
1c) How do teachers define PBC?  
1d) What do teachers perceive to be the 
desired behaviors or outcomes from PBC? 
e) How do the stated aims and perceived aims 
of performance-based compensation vary? 
20 teacher 
interviews, 1 
principal 
interview, 4 
policy documents 
Inductive and deductive 
coding, matrix analysis, 
constant comparative 
analysis by participant 
type – policymaker, 
administrator, novice 
teacher, veteran teacher 
2) How does culture mediate the enactment of PBC? 
2a) What is the role of Confucianism?  
2b) What is the role of school culture? 
20 teacher 
interviews, 1 
principal 
interviews, 4 
policy documents 
Inductive and deductive 
coding, matrix analysis  
3) How does performance-based compensation (PBC) shape instruction? 
3a) How does PBC shape motivation?  
3b) What is the relationship between effort and 
performance? 
20 teacher 
interviews 
Inductive and deductive 
coding, matrix analysis  
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Research Design Rationale 
 
As mentioned earlier, until recently PBC has been adopted at a local level and for short 
periods in school districts that grapple with poor educational outcomes. While England and 
Wales have adopted a national PBC system, it has only been in place since 2013, and it has not 
profoundly penetrated the system. Also, England and Wales have neither led in comparative 
international assessments nor are seen as “reference societies” in GEP. These countries are 
examples of those that are just beginning to situate education policy in larger domestic policy 
goals related to economic improvement and innovation (Henig, 2013).  
Studies of merit pay have largely focused on impact over implementation. These 
econometric studies generally ignore the policy, political, organizational, sociocultural, and 
behavioral variables that shape merit pay implementation and impact. In addition, econometric, 
context-neutral approaches do little to interrogate the fact that teacher accountability policies, 
such as merit pay, are expected to perform well regardless of place, context, or interpretation 
(Sahlberg, 2011). Such thin analyses of merit pay pilots have little leverage in advancing our 
understanding of incentivism in the context of high stakes teacher accountability in GEP.  
Scholars who have documented the need for context-sensitivity note that the efficacy of 
accountability policies can only be understood through multi-focal investigations of impact and 
implementation that explicitly attend to policy actors’ perceptions of said policies (Glewwe, 
2014; Verger, 2014). Contexts in which high stakes accountability policies such as merit pay are 
enacted on a state or national level, for a significant period of time, offer a more comprehensive 
landscape to study policy performance. To understand the capacity of incentivism to positively 
affect teaching and learning, research must look at subjective variables, such as motivation and 
self-efficacy. Research is needed that methodologically consider impact and implementation, 
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honors complex context, and examines regions that are embracing teacher accountability policies 
on a comprehensive level. Shanghai, China’s public schools are an ideal case for such research. 
Constructionist Approach to Multilingual Research 
In all qualitative forms of research, and particularly in interviews, language is the means 
through which we investigate, interpret, and theorize on phenomena. As Inhetveen (2012) 
explained, “language is crucial for all methods that aim at tracing the participants’ generalized 
patterns of meaning and experience” (p. 29). I employed a constructionist, ecological approach 
(Temple, 2002; Temple & Edwards, 2002; Temple & Young, 2004) to this multi-lingual 
research. I exercised three particular tactics in this approach: 1) partnerships with co-researchers, 
2) honoring Confucian norms, and 3) translation for meaning.  
Partnerships With Co-Researchers 
 
In cross-cultural and multilingual research, interpreters bear great influence upon the 
administration and translation of data. Interview content widely differs based upon the discourses 
and narratives that the interpreters, interviewees, and researchers assemble during the dialogue 
(Rosenblatt, 2012). In turn, interpreters must be removed from the role of “shadowy figure” 
(Temple, 2002) and considered legitimate co-researchers in all phases of data collection and 
analysis. Relatedly, the articulation of the qualifications and background of the interpreters lends 
to greater credibility and trustworthiness of their “hybrid” roles as “analysts and cultural 
brokers” (Matteson & Lincoln, 2009; Larkin, Dierckx de Casterlé, & Schotsmans, 2007).  
To accurately and carefully interpretation the interviews, I worked with three co-
researchers from East China Normal University (ECNU) and used a dialogic translation and 
interpretation procedures. I established partnerships with three (as opposed to just one) co-
researchers for a few reasons. First, working with more partners was the best solution for a 
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limited data collection period of just four months. Second, translation by committee reduces loss 
of clarity, increases congruence (i.e., word equivalence), and offers opportunities to compare 
versions of interpretation from multiple viewpoints that are informed by interpreters with various 
backgrounds and experiences. (Esposito, 2001). In addition, my co-researchers were interested in 
educational research, and this project gave them a platform to learn qualitative research methods. 
My co-researchers were Lu Keyi, Yang Yang, and Zheng Xue, three, early 20s, female 
Master’s students of teacher education at ECNU. They were students of Professor Jiacheng Li, 
Professor of Curriculum Studies and Co-Director of the ECNU Institute of School Reform. 
Professor Li’s research focuses on the educational opportunities of internal migrant students, the 
teaching practices of banzhuren (i.e., the head class teachers who impart character and civics 
education), and parent-teacher partnerships in innovative homework routines. Professor Li has 
partnerships with over 100 schools in Shanghai and also works with schools in cities in China 
such as Changshou, Wuxi, Guizhou, Xiamen, and Shenzhen. He has hosted numerous 
conferences at ECNU that have featured well-known scholars in China and scholars from foreign 
institutions in the U.S., U.K., Sweden, Australia, The Netherlands, and Finland. Professor Li also 
regularly collaborates with faculty from Vanderbilt University and University of Michigan. 
Alongside Professor Li throughout their three-year Master’s program, these students collect data 
in schools, analyze data, and writing academic articles for his various research projects.  
In spring 2015, Professor Li introduced me to Keyi, then a first-year student, who joined 
me during the research design development phase. In fall 2016, Keyi introduced my project to 
Yang and Xue, two of Professor Li’s new students. Since fall 2016, the four of us have worked 
closely together. Originally from Zhejiang provence, Lu Keyi attended University of Nanjing for 
her Bachelor’s degree in secondary education. Zheng Xue is originally from Sichuan provence 
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and earned her Bachelor’s degree from Sichual Normal University in elementary education, and 
Yang Yang is from Guangdong provence and earned her Bachelor’s degree from Zhejiang 
University in secondary education. As highly selective universities, these three institutions 
typically select the top five percent of high school students in China. All three students 
completed a student teaching practicum as part of their Bachelor degree requirements, passed 
English proficiency exams with the highest honors, and they matriculated directly into the ECNU 
Master’s program in Pedagogical Studies. The three students come from what is considered 
lower middle-income families in China. Their parents have educations from universities in 
China, and they held jobs in government offices and medium-size companies. As is common 
with university students and faculty, all three students and their families are members of the 
National Communist Party. My co-researchers mediated interpretation, gave insider knowledge 
to language culture, were included throughout research design, and they were recognized in this 
reporting of research. Playing the role of cultural conduits, transcriber, interpreter, translator – 
these partners and coresearchers pave the way for the rigorous, trustworthy analyses needed in 
cross-cultural research studies of global education policy.  
Honoring Confucian Norms Within Anglo Qualitative Research Traditions   
Park and Lunt (2015) explained that the Confucian tradition of saving face is “endemic to 
the challenge of qualitative research” because participants’ desires to produce “socially desirable 
answers” is inevitable (p. 11). In reflecting upon the clash of Confucian norms with Anglo 
research traditions in their research on performance-pay with South Korean civil servants, Park 
and Lunt reported, “prior to the interview, several participants said they had many complaints 
about incentives, but during the interview their answers were far more guarded…the interview 
may still have difficulties in obtaining clear perceptions, particularly in organizational contexts 
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where Confucianism can constrain by producing organizationally desirable responses” (p. 11). 
Their critical question, “how are such (Confucian) normal balanced are displaced by those 
associated with western qualitative research at the stage of analysis,” (p. 11) guided a great deal 
of my thinking. One illustrative example that the researchers provided considered how a Western 
tradition of comprehensive, systematic analysis of qualitative interviews that presents a balanced 
view of findings and honors all perspectives, even critical ones, was somewhat at odds with 
Confucian traditions of public displays of optimism and communal goals. The balance and 
privileging of cultural normal and research paradigms was an issue I considered throughout 
research design, not only during the analysis phase.  
Fontana and Frey (2005) explain that researchers must consider several issues in 
qualitative research design. Researchers must consider access to and location of the site(s) and 
participants, participant language and culture, trust, rapport, and collection of key materials 
related to data (e.g., audio, video, photography, documents, artifacts). In my weekly meetings 
with my co-researchers, we discussed these issues from a Confucian stand point. School M1 was 
20 miles or 80 minutes (by metro and taxi) from my home. I was an outsider in my own 
neighborhood but particularly foreign to these school surroundings.  
Most of the teacher participants were Shanghainese and thus spoke both Shanghaihua 
and Chinese Mandarin, Putonghua, as primary languages. Confucian values were deeply 
embedded in their approach to teaching and learning, sense of professional responsibility, and 
their way of participating in society (Park & Lunt, 2015). Teachers’ preexisting relationships 
with Professor Li and my co-researchers helped establish a strong foundation of trust with the 
teachers (Garton & Copland, 2010). Also, Shanghai teachers are accustomed to school-based 
research. Small and large-group observations of teaching (i.e., lesson study) and action research 
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are longstanding traditions in this Confucian culture. ECNU-facilitated introductions to 
principals coupled with my status as an Asian female who formerly taught elementary grades and 
who speaks limited Putonghua created an atmosphere of inside research. However, the variables 
that created an insider experience (e.g., gender, ethnicity, profession) were present alongside 
variables that created an outsider experience (e.g., citizenship, ethnicity, language). No one 
single identity marker superseded another, thus reflecting a more nuanced insider-outsider 
research among my co-researchers and me (Mercer, 2006).  
Translation and Calibration of Meaning 
 
Scholars who reject a positivist approach and advocate for a constructionist lens cite a 
number of issues in the translation and interpretation of multilingual research. Feminist 
researchers Temple (2002) and Edwards (1998) offered a social constructionist approach to 
translation that departs from a quantitative, positivist view that word equivalence requires 
forward-backward translation. A positivist paradigm sees interpreters as something to “control 
for” and a “threat to validity” and thus often strives to make interpreters “invisible in the process 
and product” (Berman & Tyyskä, 2010, p. 179). By viewing research as “language free”, this 
approach presumes congruence (i.e., equivalence) and clarity (i.e., meaning), retains one-to-one 
correspondence in source and target languages (Larkin et al., 2007). A constructionist approach 
forces researchers to consider “serious questions about ambiguities and ownership of translated 
language content; assumptions about community familiarity and cultural similarity between 
researchers, translators, and participants; negotiation of power and authority in the research 
process; and the risks faced by translators” (Berman and Tyyskä, 2010, p. 186). 
Prioritize the transfer of meaning over equivalency. Matteson and Lincoln (2009) 
warned that as researchers code and interpret language, their own voices can “drown out those of 
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the participants” (p. 659). Temple and colleagues (2006) explain cross-cultural research is 
fundamentally reconstructed primary data and bears great resemblance to the examination of 
secondary data and thus holds great barriers in terms of reflexive interpretation. Simon (1996, in 
Temple et al., 2006) comments underscored the contentious nature of word equivalence:  
 The solutions to many of the translator's dilemmas are not to be found in dictionaries, but 
rather in an understanding of the way language is tied to social realities, to literary forms 
and to changing identities. Translators must constantly make decisions about the cultural 
meanings which language carries, and evaluate the degree to which the two different 
worlds they inhibit are 'the same'. These are not technical difficulties, they are not the 
domain of specialists in obscure or quaint vocabularies. They demand the exercise of a 
range of intelligences. In fact the process of meaning transfer has less to do with finding 
the cultural inscription of a term than in reconstructing its value (p.7) 
 
In contrast to English-speaking North America’s low-context culture, linguistic meaning 
is more deeply engrained in Chinese culture, and thus analysis of interview data includes both 
translation and calibration. Jagosh and Boudreau (2009) explain, “Whereas translation involves 
finding equivalency between source and target languages, calibration explores whether a word 
has the same placement or weight in the linguistic field of the target language as the source 
language” (p. 105). Temple and Young (2004, in Jagosh and Boudreau, 2009) further explained, 
“the lack of one-to-one relationship between language and meaning does not absolve the 
researcher from investigating the role of language in cross-cultural research. Instead, it indicates 
that the boundaries of language are permeable” (p. 174). Nontransferability of language is thus 
neither a limitation nor a failure but rather a key element to and the essence of a social 
constructionist approach to cross-cultural research. To calibrate and illuminate areas of 
nontransferability of language, or language resistance, piloting and pretesting research 
instruments is helpful (Jagosh & Boudreau, 2009).  
In addition to Temple and Young’s (2004) methods of researcher-translator (i.e., 
researcher acts as translator) and researcher plus translator (i.e., researcher outsources translators 
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to independent, external personnel), Fersch (2013) proposes we consider that oftentimes 
researcher-translator plus interpreter. Oftentimes researchers who are translators must interpret in 
a language in which they are fluent but is not their native tongue. As such, word equivalence, 
clarity, courtesy, and calibration become a challenge. 
Scholars have suggested three analysis activities to ensure translators “transfer the 
meaning of the words rather than re-writing them” (Al-Amer, Ramjan, Glew, Darwish, & 
Salamonson, 2014, p. 1159) and to increase the overall trustworthiness of data interpretation: 
debriefing sessions with co-researchers, independent verification of the accuracy of translation, 
and construction of independent categories to address word equivalence (Temple et al., 2006). 
Four dimensions of translation – cohesion, congruence, clarity, and courtesy (Larkin et al., 2007) 
– guided our data collection and interpretation procedures. Larkin and colleagues explain 
cohesion reflects the balance of interpreter-researcher, interpreter-participant, and researcher-
participant relationships, and as well as the interpreters’ cultural and linguistic knowledge and 
the researcher’s methodological expertise; congruence denotes the linguistic equivalence (i.e. 
word, syntax, grammar, concept) between the target and translated languages; clarity attends to 
the quality of detail and meaning across the languages; and courtesy represents the balance 
between formal and informal data and appropriate application of cultural decorum.  
Case Study 
To understand the implementation and impact of incentivism on teachers, I employed 
purposeful stratified sampling in a qualitative, multisite case study (Yin, 2003). Multisite case 
studies are a useful way to expand our incomplete understanding of complex, interrelated 
phenomena such as incentivism and teaching quality (Yin, 2003). Investigating the phenomenon 
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of incentivism in multiple cases was important because the model has not been fully 
conceptualized, as others and I have argued (Malen et al., 2015; Verger, 2014).  
I investigated incentivism in the form of merit pay (i.e., performance pay, pay-for-
performance), or financial bonuses that led to greater compensation and were determined by 
various performance metrics, including but not limited to student performance on standardized 
tests of core subjects. This form of enticements is the most pervasive in school autonomy 
policies today and is advocated for by the OECD and leading world economies (OECD 2009; 
United States Department of Education, 2015). My methods included semi-structured interviews 
and document analysis. In this multisite case study, I interviewed 20 teachers and the principal at 
Schools M1, a high performing elementary schools in Minhang District in Shanghai. I also 
reviewed school, city, and national documents on merit pay. In this section I describe the data 
collection and analysis that occurred in detail. I refer to the faculty and students from East China 
Normal University (ECNU)who supported the collection, translation, and interpretation of data 
throughout the duration of this research as my co-researchers. The participant breakdown, 
interview protocol, and a list of key terms are all located in the appendix. 
Purposeful Stratified Sampling 
In school year 2014-15, Shanghai had 764 public schools with 798, 686 students and 
52,321 teachers. The budget for expenditure on public schools is 10,961,715 USD (76732 
million RMB), which represented 12.4 percent of the total budget (Statistical Yearbook, 2016). 
The public schools of Shanghai are divided into 17 districts, which are located in the urban core, 
inner suburbs, and the outer suburbs. Nine districts comprise the urban, original core of 
Shanghai: Huangpu, Luwan, Xuhui, Changning, Jing’an, Putuo, Zhabei, Hongkkou, and Yangpu. 
There are nine inner and outer suburban districts, of which the fastest growing is Minhang, and 
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Chongming island is a district accessible by bridge. The 2014-2015 school year rankings were 
published on November 11, 2015. Each district designated first, second, third, and fourth place to 
several elementary, middle, and high schools. Compulsory schools with grades 1-9 were placed 
in a separate category. A map of Shanghai and a list of the 2014-15 Minhang District school 
ranking are located in the Appendix. 
In July and August of 2016, I employed a purposeful and stratified sampling technique 
(Creswell, 2003) to select schools and participants for a multisite case study. In order to 
investigate merit pay enactment and impact, I targeted schools that were high performing and 
had robust merit pay programs. These criteria offered opportunities to test two intersecting 
hypotheses: 1) merit pay will increase an agent’s motivation to improve, thereby leading to 
optimal behavior on the part of the agent and optimal output (Springer, 2009; Weiner, 1980); and 
2) high performing schools, such as those in Shanghai, are models for education reforms and 
practices that lead to high quality teaching and learning (Burningham, 2014; Morrison, 2014; 
Schleicher, 2016; Verger, 2014). School performance was determined through publicly available 
school rankings on the Shanghai’s district’s websites. The 2014-2015 school year rankings were 
published on November 11, 2015. School performance was determined through publicly 
available school rankings on the Shanghai’s district’s websites.  
My co-researchers suggested that given the sensitivity of the policy, it was best to target 
highly ranked elementary (grades 1-5) and compulsory (grades 1-9) schools in Minhang District, 
as the ECNU faculty members had preexisting relationships with many schools in this area. In 
summer of 2016, via e-mail, my co-researchers and I contacted the principals of 13 elementary 
schools in Minhang ranked in first and second place. We sent an introduction e-mail and a short 
survey of interest that addressed the selection criteria of a high performing school and a robust 
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merit pay program. The survey of interest determined whether merit pay was fully implemented 
for at least five years, comprised a substantial amount of teacher salary, and whether student 
performance on standardized tests was a merit pay measure (see Appendix). 
Three schools responded with interest in participation. When I met informally with the 
principals of these schools, I answered their questions about the study and conveyed my 
commitment to anonymity, confidentiality, and reciprocity in the form of professional 
development. I also asked additional questions to ascertain whether the school had a balance of 
veteran and novice teachers in terms of overall experience and experience in that particular 
school. In addition to the criteria of high performance and robust merit pay, teachers with varied 
years of experience in the school and in the profession was important for obtaining varied 
perspectives on purposes of merit pay and the policy’s impact on teaching. The Principal of 
School M1 offered the greatest access to teachers and was open to a long-term research project.  
School M1. In school year 2014-15, there were 65 schools in Minhang. M1 ranked in 
first place in each district. Upon the merger of two nearby elementary schools in the district, M1 
was reorganized and renamed in 2012. In 2014-15, M1 had 1,200 students and 80 teachers. The 
principals and vice principals reported that the schools employed teachers with a range of one to 
30 years of experience as educators and experience in the school, and the average years of 
teaching experience among the teachers was ten years. 
M1 offered seven academic subjects – art, Chinese, English, mathematics, music, 
physical education, and science, and it held the the designation of experimental schools. 
Experimental schools in Shanghai typically have a record of strong student outcomes and 
actively participate in research partnerships with universities and serve as incubation sites for 
organizational, pedagogical, and curricular reforms. M1 received district and city accolades for 
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their Young Pioneers (i.e., red flag brigade) program, teacher professional development 
programs, civics education, and teacher moral education training, and it is a teacher 
demonstration school. M1 followed the 2009 city mandate to implement a 70-30 percent base 
pay-merit pay program in their schools. The teachers received a monthly salary that included 
both base and merit pay.   
Collection of Interview Data 
In fall of 2016, using an interview guide, my co-researchers and I conducted semi-
structured, one-to-one interviews (Bryman, 2004; Flick, 1998) with 20 teachers at M1 and with 
the principal.  
Protocol. In January of 2016, I created an interview guide based on Patton’s (1990) 
framework, using informal, open-ended, and more formulated questions. Previous studies and 
theory on incentivism and teacher development informed this protocol. In spring 2016, I piloted 
the interview guide in Chinese Mandarin and in English with my co-researchers. After we 
refined the major and probing questions, we met with a focus group of five elementary school 
teachers and tested the translation of keywords in Chinese Mandarin to check for for consistency 
in meaning. The Appendix contains a list of Chinese Mandarin and English key terms that were 
used frequently during the the interviews. 
The four sets of questions in the interview guide elicited participant perspectives on the 
aims of merit pay, implementation of merit pay, impact of merit pay on motivation to improve 
teaching, and impact of merit pay on relationships. The cognitive method of probing was 
employed in order to help verbal material that would be useful for congruence and clarity in the 
translation process (Matteson & Lincoln, 2009). Each interview question thus included at least 
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four scripted probes for the co-researchers to choose from, and we used spontaneous probes 
throughout the interviews, also.  
Participants. The M1 Principal requested to facilitate the organization of teacher 
interviews according to my selection criteria. This request was common in school-based research 
in Shanghai because of the large faculty sizes and block scheduling approach in the schools. 
During the information gathering interviews, the principals offered to set up the interviews 
according to my criteria. I interviewed 20 teachers, approximately 25 percent of the faculty, in 
each school. The participant sample reflected diversity by grade level, subject (Chinese, English, 
mathematics, science, art, physical education, music), years of teaching experience, years in the 
school, age, and amount of merit pay received in the 2015-16 school year. Because 
approximately 90 percent of elementary school teachers in Shanghai are female, it was 
understood that the sample would include relatively few males. An inventory of the participants 
is located in the Appendix. 
Structure. Interviews lasted between 20 to 60 minutes each. Interviews with principals 
took place during the school day in each principal’s respective office. Interviews with teachers 
took place during teachers’ preparation periods (with principal permission) and after school 
hours. One co-researcher and I conducted and audio-recorded (with consent) all interviews in 
person in a large meeting room at each school in Chinese Mandarin. I interviewed each teacher 
once and the Executive Principal twice. The first interview with the principal focused on 
understanding their perceptions of the aims of merit pay, policy enactment, and the ways in 
which incentivism shapes teachers’ motivation to improve instruction. The second interview with 
the principal probed for clarifications on merit pay policy as written and as implemented and the 
capacity of incentives to shape instructional improvement. Teachers were asked about their 
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perceptions of financial bonuses, the impact of bonuses on instruction and collegiality, and their 
personal experiences with incentives. I contacted teachers via text message or via e-mail with 
follow-up questions. In Confucian cultures such as Shanghai, administrators and teachers often 
meet with researchers during working hours or on the weekends, and all participants receive a 
small gift and refreshments for their participation (Park & Lunt, 2015). Upon the 
recommendation of my co-researchers, I gave the principals and all teachers participants small 
gifts worth approximately five dollars per item.  
Collection of Document Data 
In spring of 2016, I gathered publicly available documents on merit pay policy in 
Shanghai. Blog posts and web-based news articles offered background on the climate around 
PBC and accountability reforms in Shanghai. I also collected research-based accounts of merit 
pay in Shanghai schools. These studies were published in non-refereed journals and written as 
Master’s theses and academic journal articles. In addition, I collected publicly available city and 
national policy documents on merit pay, and the M1 principal gave me school merit pay policies. 
Most documents were published in Chinese Mandarin. I used one document review template for 
the popular and university-based research documents. In this template I recorded a summary of 
content, and, as applicable, performance incentives aims cited, findings, and relevant citations.  
Data Analysis Procedures 
Goal-setting, expectancy, and agency theory guided the initial set of codes used to 
analyze the interview data. Such a multilayered view of individual behavior was necessary to 
fully capture both policy aims and participants’ interpretations of financial bonuses. All 
interview data were transcribed in Chinese Mandarin, translated to English, and then and 
analyzed to address the central questions motivating the study. The analysis of the interview and 
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policy document data occurred in four steps: translation, coding and memoing, check for 
disconfirming evidence, and review of interpretation.  
Translation. My co-researchers transcribed the interviews and the school, city, and 
national merit pay policy documents. Whenever possible, the co-researcher transcribed the audio 
recordings of the interviews in which she was present. To ensure consistency in the interpretation 
of specialized terms, the translators used the list of key terms in Chinese Mandarin and in 
English. In each transcript, we searched for the key terms in Chinese and checked for accurate 
English translation of the term in the context in which it was mentioned. We consulted one 
another and corrected inconsistencies throughout this process. I met with ECNU faculty in the 
Department of Governance and Management to review the policy translation and discuss 
meanings and processes surrounding key implementation terms.  
Coding and memoing. I coded the interview data inductively and deductively. I coded 
the entire dataset once inductively; then used a constant-comparative analytic approach (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967) to modify, delete, replace, or expand upon these codes based upon sentiments 
evoked by the participants; and then I coded the entire dataset a second time. Throughout this 
process I wrote and refined memos on emerging themes. Each memo contained excerpts of 
interview data that supported and refuted the emerging theme, a list of clarification questions, 
and relevant school context. I also maintained a list terms in Chinese Mandarin that were often 
used and required further refinement in English translation and a list of questions for 
investigation in future research.  
After the first round of coding I wrote a memo on emerging themes for each research 
question. Each memo contained excerpts of interview data that supported and refuted the 
emerging theme. I also included a list of clarification questions on these themes and on school 
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context that were relevant to the themes. I revised the memos after the second round of coding. I 
created a separate memo of a list of terms in Chinese Mandarin that were often used and required 
further refinement in English translation. I also created two flow charts – one to describe the 
policy processes outlined in the policy documents and by administrators, and one to that 
highlighted policy implementation as characterized by teachers.   
Check for disconfirming evidence. I selected a random sample of one page of text in 
five (25 percent) out of the 20 teacher interviews in order to check for disconfirming evidence 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). My co-researchers and I coded this random sample. There was 90 
percent agreement in assigning a given code. We also performed a syntax analysis on this 
random sample to analyze the descriptive words that teachers most often used when they 
described their perspectives on merit pay impact and implementation. We used this list of high 
frequency words to further refine the memos of findings and build depth to the findings. The 
constant comparison, keywords in context, and domain analysis procedures improved the 
reliability and trustworthiness of the data (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007). 
Strengthen interpretation of findings. I shared my memos with an ECNU professor of 
teacher education who works with over 100 schools in Shanghai. I also held data interpretation 
meetings with the principal and one teacher in each school. During these meetings, I shared 
condensed versions of the memos and gave a short presentation of findings. The participants 
added rich context on cultural and micro institutional variables that shaped merit pay perceptions 
and policy implementation.  
Strengthen interpretation of findings. I shared my memos with two professors of teacher 
education at ECNU who work with teachers and principals on curriculum and instruction in more 
than 100 schools in Shanghai. I also shared my memos with the principals and one teacher in 
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each school. During these data interpretation meetings, I explained findings and offered several 
examples of interview data that exemplified each finding. The principals helped refine the policy 
implementation flow chart and added rich context on micro institutional variables contributed to 
differences between policy design and implementation. The teachers added rich context to 
explain the cultural underpinnings of findings related to impact on teacher practice.  
Strengths and Limitations of Research Design 
Readers benefit deeply from qualitative case studies because this approach is most 
harmonious with our natural way of learning things – through experience. To generate in-depth 
understandings of how incentives shape teachers, students, and schools, qualitative case study 
offers an accessible documentation of experience. Still, this was a study of multiple schools in 
just one region. These findings are neither generalizable nor capture all views within the site 
itself. Relatedly, I was not in these schools for extended periods of time. Interview data were 
collected in a relatively short time period due to the extensive time required for transcription and 
translation. Ethnographic methods that included observations and debriefs likely would have lent 
to a more thorough representation of the context, climate, and culture of the schools and 
participants.  
There are also limitations to the interview method both generally and as applied to this 
case study. Aiming to capture participants’ perceptions of overall patterns of interaction and 
themes rather than specific, isolated incidents, I asked open-ended questions and then probed for 
examples. I also used member checks frequently. However, because of my limited Chinese 
Mandarin proficiency, it was challenging to clarify and probe for meaning when participants’ 
self-reports were conflicting, vague, or even particularly intriguing. I chose to honor the flow of 
communication and mimic as natural of a conversation as possible rather engage in translation 
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throughout the interviews. Instead, my co-researchers and I isolated a few probing questions 
from the interview guide and from our own thoughts and spent the last five minutes or so on 
clarifying or expanding participants’ responses.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, by using the English translations of interview 
transcripts rather than the Chinese Mandarin transcriptions, it is possible I inadvertently drew 
upon my tacit knowledge of school improvement, teaching, and learning in my interpretation of 
participants’ views. It is also possible that through translation, the nuanced and delicate details 
around policy implementation were omitted or ignored, and participants’ unique feelings and 
interpretations of bonuses were misunderstood or underemphasized. Testing for non-confirming 
evidence and data interpretation meeting with teachers helped mitigate these challenges. 
Despite these limitations, this study has several important strengths. In comparison to the 
total number of schools in Shanghai, the number of schools and participants studied is small. 
However, in comparison to the literature on PBC, this study offers a much needed qualitative 
exploration of questions that are understudied in a site that is crucial to global education reform. 
The careful and thorough analysis procedures allowed my mental “organizers” to guide the study 
but encouraged concepts and concerns to surface as they become acclimated with the case.  
Researcher Role 
Shanghai has been my home since 2009. I know the streets, food, and the ways of the 
people. I know what is trendy, traditional, and what generally matters to people. I speak the 
language well enough to convey myself and to understand others. All of this, plus my Indian 
phenotype, make me an insider. But Shanghai has always made clear to me, I am a laowai, a 
foreigner, in their Shanghainese and Chinese cultures, and this comes with advantages and 
disadvantages. In the context of this study, participants likely saw me as a fellow educator who 
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perhaps had some capacity to express their voice and represent them in ways they could not 
achieve within the confines of their culture and profession. Yet both they and I knew that I would 
never fully understand what it meant to be a teacher in Shanghai, and thus I would never fully 
understand their experiences. As with all research involving human subjects, complex 
phenomena, and especially in research with multiple languages, I took great care to convey, in a 
culturally appropriate fashion, my longstanding commitment to understand the everyday and 
usual of Shanghai, and acknowledge that I was an appreciative guest in their culture. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FINDINGS 
In this chapter I report on findings from my investigations of several research questions. I 
begin with a discussion of findings on policymakers’ stated and teachers’ perceived aims of 
performance-based compensation. I then discuss how teachers and administrators enacted PBC 
in the context of Confucian school culture. Last, I report on findings from my analysis of teacher 
perceptions on how bonuses shaped their motivation to improve their performance.  
I find that a culture of deference, stability, and individual responsibility made it possible 
for what is essentially a salary supplement system to thrive. City and district policymakers and 
the principal of School M1 suggested bonuses were intended to incentivize teaching quality. The 
M1 teacher participants viewed financial bonuses as a mechanism to incentivize increased effort 
that could differentiate strong from weak teachers but not necessarily yield improved teaching 
quality. Teachers perceived low valence and instrumentality, high expectancy, and they had 
mixed views on fairness. In distinguishing effort from performance, teachers suggested bonuses 
had no impact on their instructional performance. 
I argue that rewarding teachers for (more of the same) effort is unlikely to positively 
shape quality. By employing a vague definition of quality, policymakers, administrators, and 
teachers remain unclear as to exactly what ends incentives are levied. This vague notion of 
quality is, however, essential for a standardization approach in global education reforms. Also, 
linking incentives with positive public recognition and self-efficacy may help lead to the 
improvements in teaching quality desired by policymakers.  
Divergent Perspectives on the Aims of Incentives 
Idea Penetration From Nation to Provence to Schools 
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China’s comprehensive domestic policy is built upon the goals of world economic 
leadership and technological innovation. The national government designated Shanghai as a site 
for economic and educational innovation. When Shanghai emerged as a free trade zone, its 
educational system followed with reforms intended to support technological advancements, 
elevate the quality of teaching and learning, and support the country’s aims of world economic 
leadership. Shanghai’s 2001 First Class City, First Class Education policy aligned broader goals 
of leading in the global knowledge economy through teaching reform initiatives (Lai & Lo, 
2007; OECD, 2012a; Tucker, 2011). New teachers are mentored by veteran teachers and 
participate in team-based professional development for at least 50 hours per year, and school 
leaders have an average of 15 years of teaching experience (OECD, 2012a; OECD, 2012b).  
Assess, reward, and differentiate teacher performance. Merit pay was also a key 
strategy in Shanghai’s teaching reform approach. In 2009, the Shanghai Municipal Education 
Commission implemented a city-wide performance appraisal, which included provisions for 
performance-pay. Policymakers suggested performance assessment, and pay linked to that 
performance, would motivate teachers to work harder and develop their professional skills. 
Performance assessment and pay was directly aimed at improving teachers and schools:  
The aim of the new performance wages allocation system is to guarantee teachers get good 
treatment and improve the quality of teachers. It also has significant effect on promoting 
balanced development of compulsory education in Shanghai.  
 
They intended to offer performance pay to banzhuren, teacher leaders, and those teachers who 
had “great achievement.”  (A new performance wages allocation system of compulsory 
education school was built in Shanghai, 2016) 
City policymakers recommended performance assessment be differentiated by teacher 
title; assess moral education, teaching, research, and professional development; and reflect 
   62 
teacher ability and achievements. Policymakers also encouraged principals to offer greater 
incentives to banzhuren, in this case the head teacher for each grade level. In addition, the city 
called upon school districts to: 1) learn about performance-based evaluation and compensation 
options from publications posted on the central government education ministry website; 2) create 
a scientific, detailed plan on performance assessment; 3) design the performance assessment 
procedures carefully; 4) employ multiple methods of performance assessment; 5) perform 
performance assessments in accordance with the chosen procedure; and 6) use performance 
assessment results appropriately (Shanghai Municipal Education Commission’ opinions on 
completing compulsory education school teacher performance assessment, 2009). A combination 
of qualitative and quantitative assessments, with input from students and families, at regular 
intervals throughout the year, was meant to “produce more forms to record the results of 
performance and build [the] personal performance development file for teachers.” The results of 
these performance assessments were to be used for performance pay, teacher promotion, and 
teacher training. 
Performance assessment was intended to be guided by a self-designed teacher “work 
plan,” a peer assessment, and an evaluation from the assessment group, which included the 
Principal, Chinese Communist Party Secretary, school teacher union chairperson, teachers’ 
congress representative, and a handful of teacher leaders: 
At the beginning of each school year, every teacher should make a plan of their work 
base on the demands of their position, and give it to school performance assessment 
group. At the end of school year, teacher should write a brief summary of their work in 
this year and do a self-assessment. Also he (or she) will get a peer-assessment and the 
assessment made by the school management. The school performance assessment group 
will synthesize all the assessments and make the final assessment of the teacher. The 
result of performance assessment has four levels: excellent, pass, barely pass and fail. 
Only 10-15% of teachers can reach the excellent level. The result of the performance 
assessment should be made available to teachers. If the teacher has questions about the 
result, he (or she) can appeal the result to school performance assessment group and 
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education authorities. (Shanghai Municipal Education Commission’ opinions on 
completing compulsory education school teacher performance assessment, 2009) 
 
Each district was to supervise performance assessment and mandated the school teacher union 
approve the school performance assessment policy under this framework.  
District Guidelines. The new performance appraisal applied to all school employees who 
began work by January 1, 2009. For compulsory education school staff salaries, the districts 
awarded funding to schools in three areas. Job subsidies, or base salary, referred to the five 
percent of monthly salary that teachers received according to their job title and years of 
experience. Workload subsidies comprised seventy percent of monthly salaries and was based 
upon teachers working hours, which was determined by the number of lessons a teacher taught 
per week. Performance rewards comprised twenty-five percent of monthly salaries and was 
intended to “reward school staff’s great achievement in different areas,…for 
overtime,…excellent (student) assessments, banzhuren (i.e., head teacher), and teaching and 
research.” Both district mandated school performance pay plans include standards for 
performance pay as well (Scheme of the Implementation of Performance Wages in Compulsory 
Education Schools in Minhang District, 2008). 
Incentivize teacher participation in activities. Performance-based teacher evaluation 
encompassed three categories of assessment – professional and ethical conduct (e.g., attendance, 
dress code), teaching, and student affairs. Merit pay was associated with teacher progress in 
teaching and student affairs. The school management teams (i.e., executive principal, vice-
principal, Secretary of Communist Party, teacher labor union representative) developed merit 
pay policy that would reward teachers for their participation in student learning and teaching 
activities. Teacher participation in student development activities was particularly important 
because the focus on “rich campus life” was a new, critical aspect of the school mission. 
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According to the M1 Executive Principal, parents in the school community were particularly 
concerned about their children’s happiness, and thus teacher participation in student affairs 
underscored positive school culture: 
Generally, we feel that the teachers in our school have a passionate and positive attitude 
towards work. The overall work environment is truly excellent. Many teachers from other 
schools would say, how do you manage to keep doing this, because we cannot go along 
with it. We think things should be like this. For example, when we organize a student 
activity such as “four seasons on campus”, every one of us will fully participate. Many 
teachers will provide ideas regarding the carry-out of the activity. This is our culture. We 
feel that it should be like this. (School M1 Executive Principal, personal communication, 
September 2, 2016) 
 
M1 offered merit pay to individual and groups of teachers for their participation in 
student and teacher competitions (see Key Terms); teacher training sessions, lectures and 
seminars; and in school-based research. A financial incentive and performance-based evaluation 
points were assigned to each activity, and in the case of competitions, to ranking levels (e.g., first 
place, second place). An incentive and points ceiling for each activity category was instituted in 
order to encourage multifaceted teacher development:  
Each category has a maximum score, and the overall maximum score is 20. You can do 
more, but it will not go over 20. It took us a long time to design this system, because we 
want the teachers to have balanced development rather than one-sided development, and 
the maximum score limit encourages them to seek development in multiple aspects.  
(School M1 Executive Principal, personal communication, September 2, 2016) 
 
Merit pay was also offered to teachers of tested subjects (Chinese, English, and Math) and tested 
grades (third through fifth) for student performance on benchmark assessments. It was unclear if 
or how teachers of non-tested subjects (music, art, science, physical education) and grades (first 
and second) received student performance scores through principal classroom evaluation and 
parent survey.  
The Executive Principal explained performance appraisal and pay helped sort teachers by 
performance and provoke more effort from underperforming teachers:  
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Yes, it needs to be disciplined and democratic, but my review result should never be 
“everybody is equally good”. We need to provide incentives through such evaluation, 
making teachers who performed well feel recognized, while also making the teachers 
who performed poorly realize that the school is aware of that. If they see the gap, they 
will make more efforts next semester. 
 
From her perspective, M1’s goal was clear: to identify and reward superior performance through 
standardized and performance-based measures: “Our principle is those who perform better get 
more pay. We cannot let the teachers feel that the more they do, the more mistakes they will 
make, or that they will get the same amount of money whether they work extra or not. They get 
more when they perform better.”  
Teacher Perspectives on the Aims of Financial Bonuses  
Most of the M1 teachers reported that they were unclear on the intended aims of 
performance pay but suspected bonuses were intended to positively shape teacher enthusiasm, 
professional satisfaction, development, and effort. A third-grade Chinese teacher suggested merit 
pay had the capacity to improve teachers’ enthusiasm and served as a guide for improvement. A 
fourth-grade English teacher elaborated that bonuses helped instill “professional happiness” in 
all teachers and encouraged teachers to work harder. In terms of specific types of work, she 
suggested merit pay was intended to encourage teachers to participate in research projects. A 
male third-grade information technology teacher echoed this sentiment. He added that before 
2009, “all teachers got the same pay no matter what they did. It was easy to become lazy.”  
Teachers elaborated that bonuses were directly tied to evidence of additional work time, 
yet perspectives differed on the significance of the bonuses. A second-grade banzhuren teacher 
likened merit pay to the work of a farmer: “It feels like a farmer’s harvest. However much you 
cultivate is how much you gain.” She emphasized, “merit pay encourages everyone to do their 
best to accomplish more work.” She reported her base salary as about 643 dollars per month and 
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between 8,500 to 10,000 dollars per years. Several teachers added that bonuses associated with 
participation in activities provided marginal salary supplements. A first-grade math teacher 
explained, “There is no ‘high salary’ and ‘low salary.’ At most, they will give you a little extra 
money to reward you. Now, we both (highly active and less active) teachers get more salary and 
merit pay. We get more money than before, but there is little difference among teachers.” The 
physical education department head for third-grade offered a different perspective. She reported 
large gaps in performance rewards: “Some people get a lot of merit pay, but some people only 
get a little.” She explained that bonuses ensured “talented and active teachers are valued” 
because previously those who “did more things” were not compensated for their extra effort. 
This teacher reported her salary as between $18,000 to $20,000 per year. When probed for salary 
figures, every teacher said they were unsure of the amount of monthly merit pay they received 
because this figure was not designated clearly in their pay stubs. Most teachers reported a range 
of between 400 to 700 dollars total in bonuses per month, with a few teachers declining to 
comment.  
Whether or not bonuses were significant, the majority of participants suggested less 
active, “lazy,” or “low performing” teachers had the most to gain from financial bonuses. A fifth-
grade science teacher commented, “For good teachers, merit pay makes no difference. But for 
the teachers who are a little poor, there might be some impact.” A first- and second-grade art 
teacher explained that active, “good” teachers already engaged in activities to support students 
and teaching, and merit pay was “just a token of affirmation.” Since 15 out of 20 of the teacher 
participants were teacher leaders (e.g., subject head, grade-level head, banzhuren), they 
represented the highest performing teachers in M1. All of these teacher leaders echoed the 
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sentiment that merit pay was likely intended to inspire more enthusiasm and participation in 
activities from the lower performing teachers.  
Incentives in Confucian School Culture: Disguising Salary Supplements as Incentives 
 As with most other policies, School M1 had autonomy to create their own compensation 
policy. Like most other schools, M1 created a policy wherein monthly salaries were comprised 
of 70 percent base salary and 30 percent performance-based salary. The school management 
team – which included the principal, vice principal, Communist Party Secretary, and Chairperson 
of the Labor Union – authored the policy. It went through several iterations, and staff were given 
multiple opportunities to offer suggestions for revisions. Like all other school policy, PBC 
earned approval from 70 percent of faculty.  
Structure and Performance Measures: A Range of Rewards and Multiple Metrics  
Teacher compensation was comprised of basic salary and performance-based 
compensation. Basic salary accounted for 70 percent of total pay. PBC included three parts: 
school-based individual performance bonuses (20%), school-based team performance bonuses 
(5%), and a district bonus for individual teachers (5%). Basic salary was distributed via direct 
deposit into teacher bank accounts on the last weekday of each month, individual and team 
rewards were distributed at the end of fall and spring semesters, and the district award was 
distributed once per year. The deposit confirmation text message that teachers received 
differentiated each type of compensation. Several teachers reported they messages did not make 
clear how much merit pay they had received. 
The criteria for the district bonus was not transparent or made available to teachers. 
Teachers reported they did not know how districts chose teachers of excellence or whom the 
district chose in a given year. Basic salary was based upon number of working hours. Working 
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hours refers to the number of lessons a teacher has taught per month. The participants in this 
study taught between 11 and 17 lessons per week, between two and four lessons per day, and one 
lesson lasted 90 minutes. Basic salary was based upon professional title. Teachers had a 
coefficient of one, teacher leaders of subjects and grade-levels had a coefficient of 1.2, and 
banzhuren had a coefficient of 1.3. Basic salary remained quite consistent, as teachers normally 
taught the same number of lessons per week. School holidays, special school events, student 
competitions, and end-of-term testing accounted for variance in basic salary.  
The individual and team-based PBC allocation and structure was far more detailed. 
Individual teachers earned merit pay for three different types of activities, and each activity was 
associated with different awards. Professional development activities included attendance in 
seminars, lesson study, peer observation, and curriculum development meetings. Teachers also 
earned bonuses for participating in action research projects. In these projects, teams of teachers, 
who were typically unified by subject, investigated pedagogical approaches through book study, 
engagement with university-based researchers, and lesson study. Lesson study refers to process 
wherein groups of teachers observe a peer teaching a lesson, debrief on the character of teaching 
and learning in the observed lesson, and then the teacher receives detailed feedback which is 
implemented in her future instruction.  
Teachers of Chinese, English, and mathematics in grades three through five also earned 
money for student performance in standardized assessments. These teachers and those of non-
tested subjects and non-tested grades also had opportunities to earn bonus pay for student 
competitions. Teachers took students to district, provence, and state competitions. Different 
bonus amounts were associated with first-, second-, and third-place rankings in these 
competitions. Physical education and art teachers in upper primary grades were heavily engaged 
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in student competitions, though teachers of all subjects reported they participated in student 
competitions. Teachers also participated in their own teaching competitions. In these events, 
teachers gave mock teaching demonstrations in order to compete against their district and 
provence counterparts for demonstration of high quality instruction and student engagement.  
Authority on awards. When asked about who was involved in merit pay determinations 
and the processes through which merit pay decision were made, most teachers spoke about 
performance appraisal. They identified the individuals and involved in and potential outcomes of 
performance appraisal. Teacher leaders in each subject and grade-level and the school 
management determined merit pay allocations. Teacher performance-based appraisal was carried 
out by a team of ten people, which included the school management, leaders in the teaching 
research group, and various teacher leaders across campus. Each teacher’s subject- and grade-
level teacher leader also weighed in on the evaluation. All teachers received performance-based 
rankings of A, B, C, or D. Typically, teachers who received an A grade also earned the most 
merit pay. The M1 Principal explained that at least 80 percent of teachers received As, 15 
percent received Bs, and no more than 5 percent received Cs. The M1 Principal had final say in 
all evaluation determinations and bonus allocations. 
Allocations: Bonuses As Supplemental Pay 
Overall, teachers were ambivalent toward the idea of merit pay as an incentive. One 
Chinese teachers described merit pay as “a salary supplement,” and a music teacher described 
merit pay as “the same as our salary before but just called something else.” A veteran teacher 
further suggested, “basically they reorganized they salary into something we can be sure about 
and something we cannot be sure about.” Teachers suggested merit pay was not much of an 
incentive and not particularly attractive in size. 
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Teachers reported their merit pay as between 285 to 1,800 dollars per semester and their 
base salary as between 430 to 930 dollars per month. The median merit pay reported was 430 
dollars, and the median base salary reported was 715 dollars. Of the eight teachers who had six 
or less years of experience, six teachers reported their merit pay as approximately one-third of 
their total monthly salary. All teachers reported their salaries did not fluctuate by more than 140 
dollars per month, or about 10 percent of their total salary. All of the twelve participants who 
worked as teachers in Shanghai before 2009 reported their salaries increased by no more than 
three percent since the onset of PBC. One teacher explained that in 2008 her total salary was 
14,290 dollars, and in 2015 her salary was 18,570 dollars.  
One teacher reported that she competed in a talent show in the district, and the organizers 
gave her 71 dollars for her participation, though this had nothing to do with the school- or 
district-based awards. This same teacher also reported that she received between 1,142 and 1,285 
dollars last school year at the end of the first semester and could not remember how much she 
received at the end of second semester. One physical education teacher reported she received 
between 1,715 and 1,860 at the end of each semester in school year 2015-16, which was one of 
the highest reported merit pay. She echoed other participants’ sentiments that there was little 
difference among teachers and “no such thing as high salary or low salary,” but everyone had 
“more money than before.” Several teachers noted they earned the most merit pay from leading 
student activities and helping their students win competitions. Other teachers explained that the 
additional salary provided by merit pay neither functioned as an incentive nor as an adequate 
reimbursement for additional effort and leadership. A mathematics teacher explained: 
For me there is not much difference. You do your job and the school assesses it. The 
fundamental work is teaching classes, grading homework, and instructing the students. I 
did this before and I do this now. The other activities have limited scores. No matter how 
much you accomplish, the highest score you can get is 20. Even if you and me get 
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different scores, the money we get is not that different. Just a few dozen or hundred yuan. 
Like me, I am the leader of the teaching and research group, I will just get a few hundred 
yuan more than the teachers in my group. So we don’t care much about it. We will still 
do our job that we had to do as a teacher.  
 
Policy Enactment In A Culture of Respect, Stability, and Community 
Teachers explained merit pay had neither positive nor negative impact on their teamwork. 
When asked about how financial bonuses shaped teamwork, a third-grade teacher explained, “In 
general, we teachers at the grass-roots level accept the standard.” Participants reported that they 
generally did not question the management team regarding performance appraisal or 
performance bonuses. While teachers offered opinions on merit pay allocation and processes, 
they were clear “pay doesn’t mean much to teachers,” and a passion for student and school 
success trumped any shortcomings of the policy.  
This teacher went on to explain that teachers did not discuss pay because their attention 
was on their classes and students. A music teacher explained that the policy “simply reinforces 
what we are already doing.” This teacher elaborated, “we don’t do things secretly. We work 
together on activities. We always do things together. It’s good for everyone. Instead of doing 
things alone, we work together and then make progress together.” One banzhuren reflected on 
the link between teacher relationships and financial bonuses and suggested that organizational 
structure and norms were negated any potential conflict posed by merit pay: 
Principals structure teams with novice and veteran teachers. Experienced teachers can 
help the novice teachers, and they can also be encouraged by the ambition of the novice 
teachers. They think about the personalities of the teachers. They give similar merit pay 
to everyone, so no one thinks about it too much. The balance is important. People are 
focused on the teaching and togetherness. 
 
Other teachers echoed these points of view and explained that teachers served to help one 
another, especially during times of struggle.  
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Effort Vs. Performance: When Incentives Take Teachers Out of the Classroom 
 
 An economic view of bonuses draws a linear relationship between financial rewards and 
teacher performance, while a behavioral view of bonuses suggests teacher perceptions of 
valence, expectancy, instrumentality, and fairness mediate the efficacy of bonuses. I assessed 
each teachers’ perceptions of awards against these variables. In most cases, the interview guide 
elicited responses from teachers that spoke directly to whether they perceived high or low 
valence, expectancy, instrumentality, and fairness. When it was unclear, I probed for their point 
of view, and in a few instances, I asked directly (e.g., “Does your teaching performance lead to 
rewards?” Responses were coded as high and low for each variable according to the rubric 
outlined in the figure below.   
Figure 2. Teacher Perspectives Incentives Related to Dimensions of Expectancy and Goals  
 Valence Expectancy Instrumentality Fairness 
High The reward is 
salient, 
sizeable, and 
appealing. 
There is a strong 
likelihood that 
effort leads to 
reward. 
There is a strong 
likelihood that 
performance leads 
to reward. 
The goals for which rewards 
are enacted are appropriate. 
The measures used to 
determine bonuses are fair. 
Low The bonus is 
insignificant, 
slight, and 
unattractive. 
It is unclear or 
unlikely that 
effort leads to 
reward. 
It is unclear or 
unlikely that 
performance leads 
to reward. 
The goals for which rewards 
are enacted are amiss. The 
measures used to determine 
bonuses are unclear or unfair. 
 
The majority of participants perceived valence and instrumentality as low and perceived 
expectancy as high. Perspectives on fairness were mixed – some participants found the goals and 
measures associated with bonuses as fair, some found these unfair, and some teachers conveyed 
neutrality. Teachers saw their practice, or their teaching performance, as inclusive of their 
instruction and participation in individual and team-based activities. No matter what perspective 
they conveyed on fairness, all teachers suggested bonuses had little impact on their instruction 
but were directly linked to their participation in activities.  
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Teaching Is A Performance 
 Teacher participants identified teacher practice as inclusive of classroom instruction and 
a range of activities that supported teacher and student development. Teacher development 
activities cited included teacher competitions, seminar attendance, peer observation, and action 
research projects. Student activities cited included student competitions, in-class and school-wide 
music and artistic performances, and student presentations of learning. Teachers suggested their 
participation in student development activities was very important for their teaching 
performance. A second-grade science teacher attributed school culture and reputation to 
importance placed on student performance:  
Our reputation really matters so we have to perform high. Some teachers are ok with 
mediocre performance, but there are not many of these teachers. The culture here is to 
satisfy students and families and make sure students are happy. Everyone wants to see the 
students show their learning. The student performance and competitions are very 
important. 
 
The majority of teachers also explained that their colleagues’ and parents’ assessment of 
their teaching was directly shaped by student performance in school activities, competitions, and 
in assessments. A third-grade physical education teacher explained that because her subject area 
was “not academic,” competitions were given a great deal of emphasis. In contrast, math, 
Chinese, and English teachers reported student performance on assessments was a core element 
of teacher performance. One third-grade English teacher explained: “There is a lot of pressure 
for students to perform well on exams. This is a big part of our teaching. Students need to feel 
happy, but they still must achieve. There is no choice.”  
Expectancy, Instrumentality, and Valence 
Teachers’ perceptions of their practice were directly tied to their views on expectancy, 
instrumentality, and valence. Overall, perceptions of expectancy were high, and perceptions of 
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instrumentality and valence were low.  
Expectancy. Teachers across all academic domains suggested effort via participation in 
activities was incentivized. Rewards for activity participation were “obvious,” “predictable,” and 
“expected” because bonuses were specifically intended to award increased effort. Physical 
education and art teachers reported that they were compensated for their effort in district, city, 
and national student competitions. They suggested these types of activities were particularly 
important in their disciplines and strong measures of student success. A fifth-grade art teacher 
explained:  
A lot of effort goes into the competitions. The competitions are very important to our 
students and for our reputation. It is good we get merit pay for doing well in these 
competitions because it takes a lot of our time and hard work. We appreciate these 
bonuses, but the competitions are still very tedious. 
 
 Other teachers, particularly the banzhuren, all of whom are grade-level heads and teach 
Chinese, described they received awards for effort in activities related to teacher development. A 
third-grade Chinese teacher, who was also banzhuren, reported that she spent a great deal of time 
on these professional development activities. She reported that she received about 3000 yuan 
(430 dollars) for her extra banzhuren tasks and her participation in professional development.  
 Overall, teachers expressed positive expectancy of rewards as associated with activities. 
When probed for how effort on classroom instruction was rewarded, teachers explained this was 
simply not the function of incentives. A fourth-grade music teacher explained: 
Merit pay is good for increasing effort in some activities. That is the only thing that merit 
pay is for. Activities are things like teacher competitions and lesson study and research. A 
lot of activities are things we do with kids. But merit pay is not for teaching, it is for 
activities.  
 
This teacher was in the minority in her explicit stance that instruction and bonuses were not tied 
together. However, most teachers echoed this sentiment. No teacher participant identified an 
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instance in which their classroom instruction efforts were rewarded. 
Instrumentality. While the majority of participants expressed high expectancy (i.e., their 
effort in teaching and student development activities was rewarded), they were unclear on 
exactly and how these rewards manifested. Teachers reported that every faculty member 
received merit pay each month, but the amount varied and was unpredictable. More specifically, 
they were unclear on how much merit pay they received, how merit pay corresponded with their 
performance, and why merit pay varied from month to month. Two teachers, who both had 
several years of experience at M1, were entirely unaware of the merit pay process. When I 
probed for salary figures, these few teachers replied, “I cannot remember…I’m not sure…my 
paystub does not tell me.”  
The other 18 teachers, however, knew their salary included a base salary and merit pay 
but were unsure of exactly how merit pay worked and what to expect on a monthly basis. A 
third-grade teacher leader of information technology and art reported his base salary as 515 
dollars per month. Providing contradictory information, he reported his merit pay as both a fixed 
120 percent of his base salary but also a bonus that changed monthly:  
Oh, I don’t know exactly how much. It changes each month. I think my salary is about 
3,600 yuan. It’s based on your professional title. This is the first part of our salary. The 
second part varies for different persons. For example, if you are an art teacher, your 
coefficient is 1, if you are banzhuren, your coefficient is 1.3. When you are vice 
banzhuren, your coefficient is more than 1, but I can’t remember the exact number. I am 
an art teacher, so my coefficient is 1. But I am also the school art teacher leader, so I get 
an extra 0.2, so my coefficient is 1.2. 1 multiply by 1.2 is the second part of my salary. 
But I don’t know the merit pay that I got recently.  
 
When probed for examples of how the performance translated into awards, a teacher of first- and 
second-grade art also narrated a vague, unclear understanding of instrumentality: 
Interviewer: How much merit pay did you receive last year? 
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Participant: I didn’t count. Now our salary increased. In the past, if my coefficient was 1, 
I only got 1600 (229 dollars), last year I got 1900 (271 dollars), and now I can get 2500 
(357 dollars).  
Interviewer: Can you explain why this changed? 
Participant: I don’t know. It just changed.  
A second-grade Chinese teacher suggested her salary in September of 2017 was approximately 
643 dollars per month, or approximately 7,700 dollars per year. Yet she reported her total salary 
for the 2015-16 school year was between 8,570 to 10,000 dollars. 
Interviewer: Would you mind tell us how much was your total salary last month? 
Participant: There was some fluctuation in my salary recently. Some extra money was in 
it.  
Interviewer: what is the extract money? 
Participant: There were four holidays. And we got some money because of these 
holidays. I think my salary is about 4,500 per month (643 dollars).  
Interviewer: How much was your total salary last year? 
Participant: I think it was about 60,000 or 70,000 (8,570 dollars or 10,000 dollars) 
 Valence. Despite that most teachers’ perceptions of the attainability of performance-pay 
were vague, and at times inconsistent, the majority of teachers found bonuses slight and 
insignificant in salary improvement. My co-researcher and I probed several teachers to better 
understand their low perceptions of instrumentality. We wondered, do teachers, and if not, why 
don’t teachers, try to understand salary breakdowns, the processes through which merit pay is 
determined, and ways to increase performance pay?  
Teachers reported understanding merit pay did not warrant their time because bonuses 
were nominal. All 20 participants reported their merit pay as between 285 to 715 dollars per 
month and their base salary as between 430 to 930 dollars per month. The median merit pay 
reported was 430 dollars, and the median base salary reported was 715 dollars. Twelve of the 
participants worked as teachers in Shanghai before 2009. All of these teachers reported their 
salaries increased by no more than three percent since the onset of PBC. Of the eight teachers 
who had six or less years of experience, six teachers reported their merit pay as approximately 
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one-third of their total monthly salary. All 20 teachers reported their salaries did not fluctuate by 
more than 140 dollars per month, or about 10 percent of their total salary.   
A fourth-grade Chinese teacher with over 30 years of experience described how both 
before and after compensation reform in 2009, her salary remained in the 800 dollars per month 
range. She explained this salary was neither enough for her nor her colleagues: 
I think maybe merit pay should offer more money. These days we all talk about dividing 
a pie fairly, but the pie is too small. So no matter how you divide it, everyone gets almost 
the same size of the pie. It doesn’t make any difference. Maybe we should enlarge the pie 
first, and then we can talk about how to divide it.  
 
Another veteran fifth-grade teacher echoed these sentiments. She said, “before merit pay, my pay 
was weak. After merit pay, my pay is still weak, it just is more complicated and more uncertain.” 
Fairness. Teachers expressed mixed perceptions on fairness. There was little dispute on 
the nature and appropriateness of the goals of merit pay. As explained in Chapter 4, teachers 
expressed merit pay aimed to incentivize teachers to put forth greater effort in teaching and 
student support activities but had little to do with improved teaching quality. However, 
participants expressed mixed views on the distribution of merit pay. Half of the 12 veteran 
teachers expressed disappointment that their salaries and those of new teachers were basically 
the same. Both the less experienced and veteran teachers took issue with awarding bonuses to 
“lazy” teachers for two reasons: 1) bonuses did not vary a great deal and thus there was little 
difference in the rewards for “hardworking” and “lazy” teachers, and 2) bonuses sizes were too 
insignificant to provoke “lazy” teachers to reform their practices. 
M1’s PBC policy allowed teachers to appeal to the school administration in the event that 
a teacher holds concerns with PBC processes and distribution. Several teachers reported they saw 
little purpose in such appeals because, as mentioned earlier, bonuses were not reflective of 
teaching quality and were insignificant. In addition, this group of teachers explained that policy 
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was not being carried out as designed, but the work culture called for discretion and deference to 
authority. For example, one teacher explained: 
I participated in a research activity. The merit pay policy said I should get 350 (50 
dollars) for my participation, but I never received this. I think since my students did not 
perform well on exams, maybe the school did not want to give me the money…I do not 
see a purpose in asking why. We don’t do that. We don’t really talk about merit pay. And 
also it is very little money.  
 
She and others explained that it was inappropriate to discuss bonuses because the only way to 
maintain fairness was through unawareness.  
Motivation Driven By Values Of Self-Efficacy and Peer Respect 
As teachers discussed their perspective son pay, they explained their motivation to 
improve their teaching performance was driven by appreciation for public recognition and a 
sense of individual responsibility for the collective mission of student success. Even though 
teachers were not clear on whether and how they were awarded merit pay, they participated in 
lesson study, action research, and teaching competitions because they knew this would improve 
their teaching and because, as a fifth-grade art teacher explained, it was “part of the culture” and 
“just what we do here.” For the teacher leader participants, engagement in professional 
development activities was worthy job requirement because it made them “proud” of their work. 
A physical education teacher elaborated:  
At first, I thought a bonus meant that my work is recognized, and my ability is 
recognized. The bonus enhanced my enthusiasm about my job. When we didn’t have 
merit pay, everyone received the same salary whether he did his work or not. Then 
schools were in a mess, and the quality of the school was not improved. The school needs 
this policy to develop. I think bonuses means something to me. It makes me devote full 
attention to my work. The bonus is not much, but it means that I am being recognized. 
 
This teacher’s sentiments mirrored those of her peers. When we discussed the benefits and 
positive influences of merit pay, the majority of participants perceived merit pay as a vehicle for 
recognition for individual work and recognition for team success.   
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In addition, teachers reported they enjoyed opportunities to receive certificates and be 
recognized in public by their peers, and especially their principals and researchers from 
universities. The majority of teachers explained they were moved by opportunities to earn 
certificates, model lessons to large groups of teachers, positive parent feedback, and positive 
principal feedback. The “extra” subject teachers of physical education, art, and music explained 
they felt a great deal of pressure to help students win competitions but “really enjoyed” the 
respect from fellow teachers and parents from success in competitions. A first- and second-grade 
music teacher elaborated: “It is a lot of work for us to take students to these competitions. There 
is a lot of pressure to win. But the children feel so happy. Their parents are so happy. When they 
are happy, they value us. We want their respect.” 
Discussion 
The M1 teacher participants reported they were unsure of the exact aims of merit pay, yet 
they perceived bonuses intended to strengthen teacher enthusiasm, improve job satisfaction, and 
incentivize teacher participation activities that supported teacher and student development. 
However, about half of teachers suggested there was no relationship between merit pay and 
teacher quality. These teachers perceived merit pay had either no effect or a positive effect on 
their own and their colleagues’ enthusiasm and professional satisfaction, was likely to provoke 
poorly performing or “lazy” teachers to engage in more activities, and offered a deserved salary 
boost to “good” and highly engaged teachers. Yet this group was quite clear that teachers’ 
increased school engagement did not necessarily lead to improved quality.  
In the view of policymakers, student activities, research, and professional development 
served as proxies and stimuli for teacher quality. In other words, rewards lead to greater extrinsic 
effort, which generates improved teaching quality. The teachers in this study, however, did not 
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draw such a connection. Nearly all teacher participants reported they did not see a connection 
between participation in student and teaching activities and teacher quality, and approximately 
half of the participants reported that there was no relationship between merit pay and teaching 
quality. Bonuses thus functioned as salary supplements rather than incentives to (re)contour 
one’s quality of teaching. Relatively harmonious teacher relationships withstood and axed the 
potential competitive outcomes of incentivism. In teachers’ words, at best, bonuses incentivized 
increased effort and work time, and this increased effort differentiated high from low performing 
teachers but did not dramatically shape the improvement trajectory of low performing teachers.  
These patterns speak to two of Goldhaber and colleagues’ (2008) propositions. In School 
M1, teachers received more pay than they did prior to 2009, when merit pay was not 
institutionalized. Also, M1 constructed a PBC policy in a way that afforded the school greater 
knowledge about teaching in order to award bonuses. However, when teachers spoke of rewards 
for effort, they referred to participation in activities related to teaching and student development. 
When they spoke of performance, they referred to participation in activities and instruction. 
Teachers were clear that their effort was rewarded, but they alluded, and in some cases were 
quite certain, their performance was not rewarded. That is, teachers drew a clear distinction 
between effort and performance.  
The cognitive frame that has propelled incentivism and performance-based teaching into 
the global education policy sphere presumes a neat, direct link between financial incentives and 
teacher performance. This idea undergirds Shanghai educational leaders’ approach to 
performance-based compensation for teachers. Shanghai city and district policymakers, as well 
as the M1 administration, adopted PBC under the premise that financial bonuses would improve 
teacher quality. The city and district mandated schools to develop performance assessment and 
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pay standards and procedures that included teacher self-, peer-, and committee-based 
performance assessment of teacher performance. Merit pay was to be allocated selectively and 
awarded to the top tier of teachers and determined based upon teacher title; ability; 
achievements; and progress in moral education, research, and professional development. School 
M1’s vision for merit pay and procedures were developed under these aspirations. 
The “front-line workers” (OECD, 2014) in this study uncovered a key breakdown in 
incentivism: the behaviors that link rewards to quality are ill defined and may have little to do 
with a teacher’s extra or more of the same work. The question of ‘what is quality’ remains highly 
contested in global education policy, let alone in scholarship on teacher preparation, 
development, certification, and pedagogy (Darling-Hammond, 2013). In GEP, notions of quality 
are generic and responsive to the needs of globalization and innovation. In Surpassing Shanghai, 
Tucker (2011) asserted high quality teachers hold “a high level of general intelligence, a solid 
mastery of the subjects to be taught, and a demonstrated aptitude for engaging students and 
helping them understand what is being taught” (p. 178). From a relational perspective on ideas 
and institutional change, the nebulous, innovation and intelligence-centered character of ‘quality’ 
translates well into the normative ideology of globalization and innovation. Because quality 
needs to remain nimble to the unforeseen and ever-changing demands of globalization and 
innovation, it retains a vague yet convincing character.  
These findings directly interrogate the economic persuasion of incentivism from two 
angles. First, advocates have posited that extrinsic rewards, such as financial bonuses, 
unequivocally provoke teachers to exert their maximum effort. These data dispute this claim. 
Most participants suggested they were clear bonuses were intended to incentive greater effort, 
but because the valence of rewards was unattractive, bonuses bore little impact on their effort. 
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Relatedly, some teachers explained they exerted their maximum effort in the name of collective 
responsibility and in pursuit of positive public recognition. Secondly, advocates have posited that 
teachers’ motivation to exert maximum effort leads to better individual performance and an 
improved teacher workforce, particularly because low performing teachers exit. Yet these 
participants suggested the effort, whether maximum or not, that was rewarded (by policy design) 
did not necessarily bear upon instruction, a core function of teacher quality. In addition, 
participants were quite clear that “poor” or “lazy” teachers were not incentivized to change their 
work because, again, valence was unattractive.  
To better understand what might be necessary to garner the improved individual teachers 
and an improved workforce outcomes espoused by incentives advocates, these participants’ 
perspectives on expectancy, instrumentality, valence, and fairness are instructive. Teachers held 
low perceptions of valence and instrumentality. They were unclear as to whether and how their 
performance led to bonuses. Most teachers found these bonuses insignificant and insufficient and 
thus did not take action to better understand bonus distribution. Yet teachers also held high 
perceptions of expectancy. They expressed confidently that bonuses were firmly linked to 
teacher effort, but mostly the kind that took place outside of the classroom.  
In their examination of the potential of a voluntary incentives program to motivate 
changes in teacher practice, Rice and colleagues (2015) concluded the valence of reward was 
critical: 
The vast majority of our survey respondents indicated that they increased their effort, at 
least in the short term, as a result of the program—perhaps because the budget constraints 
of the district made the rewards particularly salient to educators as a rare opportunity to 
augment their salaries, and perhaps because the size of the maximum potential awards 
available through the FIRST program met Lawler’s (1990) recommendation that the 
incentives should constitute at least 10% to 15% of one’s salary….teacher reactions are, 
at least in part, a function of the size of the rewards…success might depend on how 
payout amounts and responses to payouts evolve over time. (p. 45) 
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This investigation found that a ten to 15 percent bonus did not elicit high perspectives on 
valence. Potential rewards at School M1 were often well above the recommended ten to 15 
percent. However, participants perceived their monthly merit pay augmented their salary in more 
of a supplement fashion than as a bonus, and these supplements were insufficient to meet their 
increasing monthly expenses in a city that was rapidly becoming costlier.   
 Rice and colleagues’ (2015) research further found empirical evidence that teachers held 
more positive perspectives on bonuses that were seamlessly tied with effort and performance:   
Expectancy theory, along with the concept of attainability from goal setting theory, 
predicts that educators are likely to be more supportive of incentives that have 
dependable connections between effort, performance, and reward. Empirical evidence 
from our study supports this idea. Teachers in our study were most positive about the 
payouts they viewed as attainable and dependable; they were most negative about the 
payouts that they perceived to be beyond their control regardless of the amount. (p. 45) 
 
In line with this work, the findings in this study suggest teachers were keenly aware of the 
connections between merit pay policy and effort. Teachers perceived the policy divorced 
bonuses from performance. From a theory of agency perspective, it is possible that policymakers, 
at all levels, were stumped and/or found it too tedious to gather information about teacher 
performance. Instead, attaching bonuses to specific activities proved a standardized, efficient 
method of gaining information about, exacting teacher effort, and holding mass amounts of 
teachers accountable to the same standards for bonuses. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Recently, OECD Director Andreas Schleicher extolled both the importance of teaching 
quality, the quality of Shanghai’s teachers, and the value of teaching for innovation: 
…And nowhere does the quality of a school system exceed the quality of its teachers. 
The East Asian school systems all pay great attention to how they select and train their 
staff. And when deciding where to invest, they prioritize the quality of teachers over the 
size of classes. They provide intelligent pathways for teachers to grow in their careers. 
High-performing countries have also moved on from bureaucratic control and 
accountability to professional forms of work organization. They encourage their teachers 
to make innovations in pedagogy, to improve their own performance and that of their 
colleagues, and to pursue professional development that leads to stronger education 
practice. The goal of the past was standardization and compliance; but today's top-
performing countries value inventiveness. In the past, policy focused on providing 
education; today's top school systems focus on outcomes, shifting from looking upwards 
in the bureaucracy to looking outwards to the next teacher, the next school, to create 
networks of innovation. You can see that nowhere better than in Finland or Shanghai. 
 
His sentiments underscore Shanghai’s increasing base of admirers and the potential for this high 
performing system to inform policy adoption in the global education policy sphere. While this 
study did not squarely study innovation, incentivism is one particular policy device that Shanghai 
policymakers levy in the name of innovation. The claim with which incentivism has penetrated 
high-stakes teacher accountability in the global sphere is fairly straightforward and compelling. 
Inherent in the theory of action behind PBC is the idea that bonuses motivate educators to behave 
in desirable ways, incentivize strong teachers to join and stay in the workforce, and encourage 
weak teachers to exit (Hanushek & Lindseth, 2009; Weiner, 1980). The idea that an incentive 
renovates teaching, learning, schools, and markets is a policy proposal that is well received by 
policy actors, such as those in Shanghai, who are persuaded by the current global education 
reform framework of innovation, competition, and globalization. 
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Shanghai found great promise in the power of incentives to improve teaching quality. 
They pushed school districts and leaders to create comprehensive performance appraisal and pay 
plans that would uplift teacher quality and transform the composition of the teacher workforce in 
a positive direction. For this to happen, the incentives structure would need to directly impact 
classroom instruction and identify and persuade poor instructors to improve at an appropriate 
pace or exit the school. Instead, the incentive structure awarded teachers largely for more of the 
same work. In a culture of stability, equality, and team-based professional norms, performance 
incentives became bland. In the eyes of the M1 teachers, bonuses were salary add-ons, and at 
their best, these supplements were insufficient to meet their growing daily economic needs. 
Johnson (2004) suggested incentives advocates misunderstand the bedrocks of teachers’ 
motivation: “In itself, higher pay is unlikely to retain teachers – particularly the most able among 
them – if they cannot attain the intrinsic rewards for which they initially entered teaching” (p. 
46). While others seek to optimize performance and recompose the teacher workforce, teachers 
seek intrinsic rewards such as trust, team membership, community membership, professional 
recognition, job security, and a viable professional future that continues to build on these 
rewards. In addition to the high political and policy costs and undesirable effects of incentives, 
this study suggests incentives have the potential to further direct teacher attention away from 
instruction and toward ad hoc activities. Indeed, professional development and student 
development activities are a core part of schooling and speak to teacher performance. Yet for 
incentives to achieve the desired end result of improved student outcomes, instruction must be a 
core focus. These findings build on previous research that suggests teachers are inspired to look 
inward and analyze their practice in the presence of opportunities for recognition and 
encouragement from their superiors, peers, parents, and students.   
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Implications 
 
Although this particular study took place in Shanghai, it is also a story about incentivist 
reforms more broadly. My findings are particular to School M1, but they have important 
implications for policy, for the leaders of other education systems that are in the process of 
adopting or considering the adoption of performance-based compensation, as well as 
implications for research. 
Policymakers often draw quite loosely from economic concepts to inform their theories 
about issues such as accountability. As equity concerns rise, policymakers default to models of 
standardization and efficiency to affect change in timely, measurable manners. But policymakers 
must also clarify how incentivism is expected to operate in public schools, how its operation 
differs in private versus public markets, and its potential effects. Policymakers must also 
consider the potential outcomes of financial incentives, both the positive and the negative, by 
paying particular attention to what drives instructional and school improvement. For example, 
incentivizing the achievement of sales targets in private firms is quite normal, but do 
policymakers expect to devote public dollars to incentive teaching quality in the same fashion? If 
so, these findings provoke policymakers to consider the ways in which School M1 teacher 
participants’ perspectives interrogated the underpinnings of incentivism. When we zoom in on 
incentivism in the classroom and consider how teachers take up policies targeted at their 
improvement, these questions push theory and policy on incentivism to revise the currently thin 
and seemingly erroneous ideology of the linear link between money and motivation in the 
context of schools.   
My findings also implore research, leadership, and policy to place a clear emphasis on 
building positive school culture that is laser focused on teamwork. The culture of School M1 is 
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one that nurtures Confucian values of individual responsibility for collective success and 
equality. In doing so, the school unites rather than pits teachers against one another and 
capitalizes on rather than manipulating harmony. Norms of deference to authority also serve to 
silence teacher concerns about the fairness and efficacy of incentives. School leaders and 
policymakers should consider how positive school culture may be a more efficacious route than 
incentivism to teaching and school improvement. Yet leaders and policymakers must also 
consider how to uplift rather than silence teacher voice. Since perspectives of pay mediate the 
enactment of compensation reform, nurturing and honoring teacher voice, particularly in an 
additive and assets-based team atmosphere, may begin to thrust teacher accountability policy in a 
positive direction.  
The M1 teachers implore policymakers and researchers alike to consider: What is the 
efficacy of bonuses when policymakers conflate effort with quality? What exact behaviors 
should policy incentivize to boost quality? If bonuses neither incentivize low performing 
teachers to perform well nor force low performing teachers to exit the workforce, what becomes 
of the incentivist policy paradigm? The M1 policy took incentives out of the classroom, and thus 
teachers equated bonuses more closely with effort in student development activities rather than 
with the core activity of teachers – teaching. When bonuses direct attention away from 
instruction, interrupt improvement processes are interrupted. Moreover, leaders must anticipate 
the consequences of a bland policy that incentivizes effort that has already been normalized in an 
equality-centered school culture and awards bonuses that are perceived as low and insufficient. 
The participant reactions in M1 to bland incentivism suggest one particularly grave consequence 
is apathy and ambivalence toward incentives. 
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Perhaps most importantly, policymakers and leaders have an opportunity to consider how 
to build an incentive structure that moves away from the high policy and political costs of VAMs 
and of public rankings of teacher performance. Student performance is just one of several 
performance metrics in School M1, and it is one that teachers say holds little weight in 
performance appraisal and pay. As the U.S. and other Western countries ramp up test-based 
accountability and tie student performance metrics to evidence-based practice and policy, teacher 
evaluation, and performance-based compensation, Shanghai and School M1 provide a blueprint 
to reenvision how incentives provoke a renewed focus on students and teaching rather than on 
testing.  
Future Research  
The findings from this study suggest at least three directions for future research. First, my 
research indicates that we need better proxies for incentives to study its effects. My work begins 
to extend and elaborate theory to illuminate the black box of incentivism in schools, and there is 
a need to explore this process in other contexts. The context of Shanghai paves a new road for 
examining incentivism in high performing, influential systems with Confucian cultural norms. 
By looking at incentivism in systems that fit this road, such as Singapore, South Korea, and 
Japan, we can begin to illuminate additional perspectives of teachers and microinstitutional 
variables that mediate policy enactment. Second, my methodological approach privileges the 
perspectives of teachers, which are sorely needed in research on incentivism. Additional mixed 
methods research that builds on interview data to develop survey instruments will afford an 
opportunity to isolate the specific behaviors of teachers that are shaped by incentives. Such rich, 
nuanced analyses that focus on and triangulate the perspective of teachers can lead us to better 
policies for teacher improvement. Mixed methods investigations will help zero in on the 
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variables of teaching quality at which to target incentives. Contextual, theory-laden 
investigations of incentives in the classroom can continue to zero in closely on the behaviors that 
ensue when teachers are faced with incentives. Third, future research will benefit from a closer 
look at the role of teacher leaders in the enactment of incentivism and their understandings of 
instructional improvement processes. As teacher leadership gains potency in school 
improvement planning, understanding the role of these individuals in brokering teacher 
interpretation of policy is of great importance. 
As leaders take up and enact incentivism upon their teachers and schools, they take a 
potentially harmful approach of linking improvement with teachers’ sense of confidence and 
fear. Research would benefit from multi method and comparative studies that focus on the 
cultural foundations of schools and school improvement. By seeing incentivist policy as situated 
in the sociocultural and political environments of schools in diverse contexts, we can continue to 
better assess the prevailing hypothesis that there is a neat relationship between an incentive, 
teacher practice, and student learning.  
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Christopher Lubienski 
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338 Education Bldg 
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Under applicable regulations, no changes to procedures involving human subjects may be made without 
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Sincerely, 
 
Rebecca Van Tine, MS 
Human Subjects Research Specialist, Office for the Protection of Research Subjects 
Attachment(s): Written informed consent document, and Waiver or Alteration of Informed Consent form  
c: Priya La Londe 
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Purposes of interview/ûćÄÅÄ 
The purpose of the interview is to better understand how teachers, principals, and other 
administrators make sense of performance incentives. Specifically: 
1.! How do participants understand the aims of performance incentives? (Q1, Q2) 
2.! What are participants’ experiences with performance incentives? (Q2, Q3) 
3.! In what ways do performance incentives contribute to teaching/leadership effectiveness 
for this teacher/administrator? (Q4) 
4.! What are the participants’ experiences with relational trust and teamwork among their 
colleagues? (Q5) 
5.! In what ways do performance incentives shape trust and teamwork? (Q6) 
 
ûćÄÅÄf]ôs«ĠV/ÔÀæg&ÀôáeBáq
Ď0%g
 
1<·ÑsĠ,´¡·ÒZ ¡Ááe9¦§¦?(Q1Q2) 
2<·ÑsĠ,´¡·Òláe9s¬¦?(Q2Q3) 
3áe9ÅĒ¬¦i#sL,´¡·Ð\ĩm»ÕÑQ4Ò 
4 +Eģ¦&+µXĥa!Ó<·s¬¦ĮÕÑQ5Ò 
5áe9ÑáaĎÒQs¬¦ik|Eģ¦&LXĥa!ÕÑQ6Ò 
Introductions, informed consent, permission to tape, Background/ÜªwEy|Ï
øB 
 
A.! [Ice-breaker, could also use some other comfortable question to get started]. Before I started 
my doctorate work, I also worked in schools. I always enjoy chatting with educators. It is my 
pleasure to be here in Shanghai and learn about you. Could you share with me how you 
decided to become an educator?  
A. Ñ“¬0½”ÓB#¤,¼Ä¦ĢĪg[ÒQ}Ą;U7,}Q\a!
ĒÓ}O±Lºa!·¹X}mÐ.»cQõývv»cL}4v
 {y|Fºa!·KÕ 
 
B.! I would like to learn more about your experiences in education. Can you tell me more about 
your experiences? How long have you taught? Which ages? Which schools? How long have 
you been a school leader? Which ages? Which schools? Where did you receive your 
training?  
 
B}xÁV+v¦ºÝFv»Jþ}V+v¦ÝFR?vVĠģ
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ÕV_pg[ÕvQ¦\Õv|ĕ\¦ĩm·VĠģÕ2pg
[ÕvQ¦\ÕQ7vQNË@R-~R÷ĒÕ 
Aims/purposes of performance incentives 
 
Now I would like to talk about performance incentives. Performance incentives are financial 
bonuses given to teachers and school leaders whose students perform well. This could be a bonus 
for an individual teacher, a group of teachers, or all the teachers and leaders in an entire school. 
Said another way, these bonuses are incentives given to teachers for improved or superior 
student performance. I am interested in learning about your perspectives on and experiences with 
performance incentives. So let’s begin, ok? 
 
1.! How would you describe the purpose of performance incentives? 
a.! How did you learn about performance incentives? Did the Ministry of Education 
or your principal explain incentives to you?  
b.! When did you first learn about performance incentives? 
c.! Please describe the performance incentive policy in your school as you 
understand it. 
d.! What do you understand as the process for receiving a bonus?  
e.! What other policies reward teachers and leaders for good student performance? 
 
2.! What is your overall view of performance incentives? 
a.! What do you think are some benefits of awarding incentives to teachers and 
school leaders for student performance? 
b.! How would you describe the challenges associated with awarding incentives to 
teachers and school leaders for student performance? 
 
Brief member check on questions 1 & 2 
 áeBÄÅÄ  
    ¿\ćùáeBáqĎáeBáqĎoßiÁñ¿6ë
ÄsVi«ĩmjÝ¸	ÄeBĕÌeBLßs%sä%æ
i«Ä¡åsVĩmAÿāÓĕeÍe9ßÉ\£À¿±3~·\£
Ė¦s¦PÓ}ÎexÁvláe9ÑáaĎÒN¦xL
Į}¿Qg[ûćÓBRÕ 
1võáe9s¬¦§¦Õ 
    a. v7s¬¡Ááe9ÕºÊġÑºÊÒ~·"¦ĠH"ÁĝĒáe
9ÑáaĎÒĕRÕ 
    b. v³ªÈÑ~·ÁÒáe9ÑáaĎÒQ'Õ 
c. vIBÃ`v¡Á¦Ó\§7k¦áeBáqĎÒ 
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d. v¡Á6¦î?eÍ¦Ē¯¬¦Õ 
    e. liÁñ¿fÄsVĩmĔ¡µ¡/ÄeBÒæ 
2vláe9ÑáaĎÒ¦©Õ 
a. võß\£À¿Y¦sLĩme9ÓuNYaÕ 
b. võl\£À¿Y¦sLĩme9¦EÓuNÕ 
/rÆ­©ĢĪ1L2  
Experiences with performance incentives 
 
3.! What are your personal experiences with performance incentives? 
a.! Please describe the incentives you have received.  
b.! How much was the bonus?  
c.! When did you receive the bonus?  
d.! How does this bonus shape your overall salary? 
e.! What do you understand to be the reason you received this bonus? If student 
performance, what specific performance warranted this bonus?  
f.! Who made this bonus allocation decision? 
g.! In your opinion, how is your experience with bonuses similar to or different from 
your colleagues’ experiences with bonuses? Please explain.  
 
4.! What are your perceptions of how incentives contribute to teaching and leadership 
effectiveness?  
a.! How do incentives shape your teaching? Approach to teaching? Commitment to 
teaching? Motivation to learn about teaching?  
b.! How would you evaluate the value or contribution of incentives to your overall 
teaching effectiveness? 
c.! What else would help you be the best teacher you can be? 
 
Brief member check on questions 3 & 4 
 
láeBÄ%Į 
3láe9v¦ĮÕ 
a. Ăćć~;Ē¬ÄáeB 
b. eğbn 
c. v'n6ĕ²eÍÕ 
d. ĕÑeBg&IÄqĎ 
e. v¡Ávn6ĕ²eÍ¦â¥ÑvªÈvPn6ĕ²eÍ¦RÒÕZ
P\£Óvõ\£À¿Z »övn6eÍÕ 
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f. Ć¥2jeğÄ7Ĝ 
g. Qv©ÓjîneÍÓv¦ĮLE¦Į hEÕÕĂĀÛĤÃ 
4"Z ¡Ááe98Ð\ĩm¦tÕ 
a. áeBg&}Wæ_ĘÒv¦\ÕZ\¦iÕl\¦õEzÕ\
\¦{Õ 
b. l%Äièg&ü áeBÄ +Ĉ¾ 
c. Ĕ¡ècvAPfås 
rÆ­©ĢĪ3L4 
 
How performance incentives shape trust and teamwork 
 
In the last part of this interview I want to talk about how incentives shape the trust between you 
and your colleagues and how incentives shape your teamwork. A lot of research tells us about 
what incentives are and the goals of incentives. But we don’t know very much about how 
incentives shape how teachers collaborate together and approach each other? So let’s begin, ok? 
 
5.! Relational Trust and Teamwork 
a.! How would you describe your relationships with your fellow teachers? Principal? 
Other school leaders? 
b.! In what ways does trust matter for in your work? 
c.! Can you give an example of 1-2 colleagues whom you trust a great deal?  
d.! In what ways do you work with your colleagues?  
e.! In your view, how does this teamwork contribute to your teaching effectiveness? 
6.! Role of performance incentives in relational trust and teamwork 
a.! In your view, how do financial bonuses shape your relationships with your 
colleagues? With your principal? Can you give an example of this? 
b.! How do bonuses for student performance shape the work you and your colleagues 
do together? 
c.! Think about a time when you received a bonus. How did your colleagues learn 
about your bonus? What made you decide to take this approach? Or if the 
Ministry or your principal shared this information, in what ways did your 
colleagues react? 
d.! Think about a time when you learned one of your colleagues received a bonus. 
Can you describe how you learned about this? Can you describe your reactions? 
e.! What other issues and concerns do you have related to performance incentives 
and your work or your work with your colleagues? 
 
Brief member check on questions 5 & 6 
 
áeBg&_Ęæ}W)!XĥO'  
Qûć¦GÊ4Ó}xÁáe9ÑáaĎÒZ lMÑ~·TÇÒvLE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ģ¦&+µÓZ lMv¦Xĥa!mV«°ĤÃáaĎ¦.LáaĎ¦§
ªÓ+áaĎZ @sģ¦D!L^5sģ¦¨+µÓ}ª¢
_}¿Qg[ûćÓBRÕ 
5+µ&LXĥD! 
a. vónvLC¶s¦+µZ ?LĠ¦+µZ ÕL,\ĩm¦+µZ Õ 
b. &ilMv¦a!¦Õ 
c. āāħw)!Ä1-2E 
d. viLv¦EÂa!Õ 
e. Qv©ÓXĥD!s¬8v¦\»¦ÐÕ 
6Q+µ&LXĥD!	Óáe9¦!¤ 
a. Qv©ÓÝ¸¦e9s¬lM"LEģ¦+µÓLĠģ¦+µÕĂ$ 
b. P\£¦À¿¸în¦eÍZ lM"LEģ¦XĥD!Õ 
c. j"n6eÍÓ"¦EZ îªĕ&u¦ÕZvJªE¦Ó%#
vJªE¦Ó%#v(3ĕ1]¦Õ~·ZºÊ~·Ġ4Ñ~·*
dÒĕ&uÓ"¦E>zZ ÕÑ"¦E¬¦i>zÕÒ 
d. xxjvªÈv¦En6eÍÓvZ îª¦Õv»Ãvj¦>zRÕ 
e. +áe9="LEģ¦XĥD!ÓvĔ,¦ĢĪRÕ 
rÆ­©ĢĪ5 & 6 
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APPENDIX C: KEY TERMS AND RECRUITMENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Table B1 
Key Terms Translation 
English Term English Definition* Mandarin Pin 
Yin 
Mandarin 
Characters 
salary overall composite of compensation a 
teacher received in a fixed salary 
distribution period 
gong zi aĎ 
base pay the total fixed salary that a teacher 
receives in a fixed salary distribution 
period 
ji chu xing 
gongzi 
SÊta
Ď 
merit pay the total variable salary that a teacher 
receives in a fixed salary distribution 
period 
ji xiao gong zi áaĎ 
merit pay bonus the variable salary determined by the 
school administration that a teacher will 
receive in a fixed salary distribution 
period  
jiang li xing ji 
xiao gongzi 
e9tá
aĎ 
district bonus the variable salary determined by the 
district leadership that a teacher is 
eligible to receive in at the end of the 
first and second semester  
qu jiang li :e9 
city bonus the variable salary determined by the city 
leadership that a teacher is eligible to 
receive one time at the end of the school 
year 
shi jiang li ce9 
motivation desire, willingness, or reasons to do 
something 
dong ji @ 
fair what is just, appropriate, legitimate, or 
within the rules and standards 
gong ping *f 
love deep affection, interest, or pleasure  ai xin ¼q  
enthusiasm eager enjoyment or excitement  re qing »w 
passion intense desire or enthusiasm ji qing w 
morality principles held by a person, group or a 
society, concerning the distinction 
between right and wrong or good and bad 
behavior 
dao de Èp 
conscientiousness, 
conscientious 
the act of doing what is right or to do 
one’s work well or thoroughly 
liang xin ¾q 
responsibility a duty to fulfill the obligations and 
assignments prescribed to a teacher 
zeren Ċ 
teaching quality a teacher’s skills and aptitude  jiao xue zhi 
liang 
\ċÌ 
team work two or more teachers working together  tuan dui he zuo XĥD! 
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relationship the interactions, relations, and 
communications between two or more 
people 
guan xi  +µ 
working hours the number of class periods a teacher 
teaches in one week 
gong zuo shi 
chang 
a!Ġ 
number of classes the number of cohorts of students a 
teacher is responsible for teaching in one 
academic year 
ke shi liang ąÌ 
competition events that occur throughout the school 
year wherein students and teachers from 
schools in neighboring districts or 
provences compete against one another 
in mathematics, science, Chinese, 
English, art, music, and physical 
education 
bi sai 
jing sai 
ďÔÐ
ď 
teacher 
competition 
events that occur throughout the school 
year wherein teachers from schools in 
neighboring districts or provences 
compete against one another to showcase 
pedagogy and instruction in their subject 
area expertise 
jiaoxuejingsais
hi fan ke 
gong kai ke 
\Ðď
Ô­¿ą
Ô*gą  
student 
competition  
events that occur throughout the school 
year wherein students from schools in 
neighboring districts or provences 
compete against one another in 
mathematics, science, Chinese, English, 
art, music, and physical education 
ti yu bi sai  
ke ji jing sai 
wenti lei bi sai 
ºď
Ô®Ð
ďÔ
Öď 
veteran teacher a teacher with five or more years of 
teaching experience 
lao jiao shi ¶s 
novice teacher a teacher with four or less years of 
teaching experience 
xin jiao shi s 
purpose the aims of a particular policy, program, 
or act  
mu di §¦ 
Head Teacher the teacher in charge of general matters 
of a class (section) of students, who 
usually also teaches one subject to the 
students of that class 
ban zhu ren  
 
Pioneer battalion 
counselor 
the counselor for a school’s Young 
Pioneers Organization 
da dui fu dao 
yuan  
Wĥđm
U 
Young Pioneer / 
Red Scarf 
Organization 
a mass youth organization for children 
aged six to fourteen under the 
Communist Party of China; usually every 
elementary student becomes a member 
sooner or later 
shao xian dui 
hong ling jin 
_)ĥ / 
Øĩb 
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Note. * These terms were adapted from their broader meanings and applied to the context of 
teachers and teaching.  
 
Table B2. 
Recruitment Questionnaire and Information Sheet 
English Chinese Mandarin 
My name is Priya La Londe. I am a doctoral 
candidate at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, a large research university in the 
United States of America. I am conducting 
research on how financial bonuses and other 
incentives shape school culture in high 
performing schools in Shanghai, China. This 
study is important because education policy 
around the world is moving toward awarding 
bonuses or merit pay to teachers and 
administrators whose students perform well on 
standardized assessments. I have two goals for 
this research. First, I want to describe the scope 
and aims of bonuses/merit pay and how they are 
used in schools. Second, I want to analyze how 
how bonuses/merit pay shapes school culture – 
specifically in terms of trust and collaboration 
among teachers. I will not collect any 
identifiable data on students or teachers. I am not 
here to judge or evaluate your school or you 
work. I simply want to better understand your 
experiences with merit pay and your thoughts 
about how these bonuses shape your work. 
KPriya La LondeP¥é"
9ă"diErÚ——ĭ¯7«ÄD`É
ÎÁ"9ă"diã[·ÉÎ^d
iÅ=²\ÉÎĉðČV/ºB
g&_Ę«YCÉÎíZ[
	¹Ä#ċi«¤ÉÎÄĞò\
Å=ÃN]Äç×àě\ê>ï
iÁñ¿ü ª4Äeğ<{¤É
Îò¡
ÅÄĬ,t¢
ôč«úÏeğÄÅÄeğÄ1ĚÞ¦
Heğ<{Äē'3/°ò
7§\ĕĒÍeğ<{g&_Ę«Y
C——½:g&}WsģÄ)!
-×O'-×JPÉÎæy
ħòėĒ³ÉÎ¥8æü Äi
«HÄq'ĒÍ$Ħ!
&sæiÁÄË)Jt¢
ècôÄÝFleğÄÆ¶H
eğg&}WÄq' 
 
Your Name, Your Mobile Phone Number, Your 
Email ID 
ÄPh , ÄÂÿMÈÄ, Õ , o& 
1) Have you ever received merit pay? If yes, 
when? How much merit pay? 
(1)Ýî~ĒeğRì¡
*î~ğībn  
2) In 2014 or 2015, did any teachers in your 
school received merit pay? If yes, approximately 
how many teachers? If yes, approximately how 
much merit pay did each teacher receive? 
(2)\2014xV2015x£ģč«¡
sî~eğRì¡d®¡5î
~´dÙbnğī 
 
3) Do you consider your school a high ranking 
or top performing school in Shanghai? If yes, 
how do you know? 
(3)\Æ¥č«\	¹ÓPĨ
=æā#ċi«Rg¨
ÇęÄ 
4) Would you be willing to participate in an 
interview with the Research Assistants and I 
about your experiences with merit pay? If yes, 
please suggest the most convenient date and time 
for you.  
(4)S¡.ĐG?ûćQV
ÄÉÎA7-eğ<{Ä%ĮV
ÝFg¨LTþ 
(Äģ 
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APPENDIX D: MAP OF SHANGHAI ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS 
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APPENDIX E: DESIGN FEATURES OF PERFORMANCE-BASED COMPENSATION PROGRAMS IN THE U.S. 
  
Program Structure Performance Measures Pay Allocation 
Region 
and 
Program  
 
Starting 
Year 
Budget in 
first year Impact 
T = Tournament 
F = Fixed 
Performance 
Contract 
I = Inputs ` 
O = Outputs 
E = Supervisor 
Evaluation 
Bonus Amounts 
States 
Florida  
 2007 
$147.5 
million  
54 out of 67 
districts F O, E 
5-10 percent of average 
teacher annual salary 
Minnesota 2004 $64 million  
1/3 of students 
in the state F I, O  
New 
Mexico  2004  
All public 
schools T, F I, O, E  
Districts 
Austin  
 2005 
$9.7 
million 
Any public 
school where 
75% of staff 
consents 
F I, O 
$1500 per Student 
Learning Objective 
achieved per teacher and 
$2000 per subject per 
teacher for reading and 
math 
Denver 1999 $25 million 
Voluntary for 
all teachers F I, O  
Houston     O  
 
Note. Adapted from “Design and Implementation Considerations for Alternative Teacher Compensation Programs,” by A. Brodsky, 
D. DeCesare, & J. Kramer-Wine, J., 2010, Theory Into Practice, 49, p. 213–222.   
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APPENDIX F: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON PERFORMANCE-BASED COMPENSATION 
 
PBC 
Program 
Incentive 
Level 
Citation Method Program 
Timeline 
Findings 
New York 
City, New 
York, 
USA 
Schoolwide  Goodman and 
Turner, 2011 
RCT 2007-2010 There was no effect on student achievement among students in 
the treatment group. Teacher absenteeism dropped slightly 
among those in the treatment group who received the largest 
incentives. 
New York 
City, New 
York, 
USA 
Schoolwide Fryer, 2011 RCT 2007-2010 There was a negative but insignificant effect on student 
achievement, attendance, and graduation among students in the 
treatment group. There was a negative but insignificant effect on 
achievement among students in the treatment group in in larger 
schools. There was a negative but insignificant effect on teacher 
behaviors among teachers in the treatment group.  
New York 
City, New 
York, 
USA 
Schoolwide Marsh et al., 
2011 
RCT 2007-2010 There was a negative but insignificant effect on student 
achievement, attendance, and graduation among students in the 
treatment group. There was a negative but insignificant effect on 
achievement among students in the treatment group in in larger 
schools. There was a negative but insignificant effect on teacher 
behaviors among teachers in the treatment group. 
Nashville, 
Tennessee, 
USA 
Individual 
math 
teachers 
Springer et al., 
2010 
RCT 2006-2009 Student in the treatment group did not significantly outperform 
students in the control group. Teachers in the treatment group 
were no more likely to report that incentives discouraged 
teachers from working together. 
Andhra 
Pradesh, 
India 
Individual 
and 
Schoolwide 
Duflo, Hanna, 
and Ryan 2012 
RCT 2005-2010  There was a positive effect on teacher attendance and student 
achievement among teachers and students in the treatment 
group. 
Andhra 
Pradesh, 
India 
Individual 
and 
Schoolwide 
Muralidaran 
and 
Sundararaman, 
2011 
RCT 2005-2010  Students in the treatment group had higher scores in non-
incentive subjects – science and social studies. Students in the 
treatment group whose teachers received schoolwide incentives 
did not significantly improve in math but improved in language. 
Kenya Schoolwide Glewwe et al., RCT 1998-1999 Students in the treatment group improved performance, but this 
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2003 was not sustained the year after the program ended. Attendance 
improved among teachers in the treatment group slightly.  
Israel Schoolwide Lavy, 2002 Regress
ion 
disconti
nuity 
1996-1997 Students in the treatment group showed reduced rates in dropout 
and increases in the number of credits taken.   
Israel Individual Lavy, 2009 Regress
ion 
disconti
nuity 
2000-2001 There was a slight positive effect on student achievement in 
math and English among students in the treatment group. 
Teachers in treatment groups were more likely to work extra 
time with low performing students, use small group instruction, 
and differentiated instruction.  
Little 
Rock, 
Arkansas, 
USA 
Individual Winters et al., 
2007 
Differe
nce-in-
differen
ce 
2003-2006 Students slightly improved their math performance. 
England, 
U.K. 
Individual Atkinson et al., 
2009 
Differe
nce-in-
differen
ce 
1999-2002 Students whose teachers had more experience showed higher 
test scores. 
Michigan, 
USA 
Individual Eberts et al., 
2002 
Differe
nce-in-
differen
ce 
1996-1999 Student improvement in course completion was the direct result 
of PBC. Student decline in attendance was not the direct result 
of PBC. 
North 
Carolina, 
USA 
Schoolwide Vigdor, 2008 Regress
ion 
disconti
nuity 
1996-2007 Students whose teachers did not receive a bonus improved 
slightly.  
Dallas, 
Texas, 
USA 
Schoolwide Ladd, 1999 Differe
nce-in-
differen
ce 
1991-1995 Students improved in dropout, attendance, and slightly in math 
and reading. Principal turnover rates increased. 
USA  Individual Figlio and 
Kenny, 2007 
OLS 
regressi
1988 
NELS and 
There was no effect on student achievement among students in 
schools with group- or school-based bonuses. There was a 
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on 1993 SAS slightly significant slightly positive effect on student 
achievement among students in schools with individual bonuses. 
The largest positive effects on student achievement were in 
schools with individual bonuses and with the most students from 
low-income families.  
28 OECD 
nations 
Schoolwide 
and 
individual 
Woessman 
(2011) 
OLS 
regressi
on 
2003 Students whose teachers received merit pay performed slightly 
better. 
 
Note. Adapted from “The Economics and Politics of Teacher Merit Pay,” by A. Leigh, 2012, CESIfo Economic Studies, 59, p. 1-33. 
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APPENDIX G: MINHANG DISTRIC 2014-2015 SCHOOL YEAR RANKINGS  
 
2014	
 
3[tÏ
2015-11-11    }
 
l2014L]Ð¼.L_ ?)L«mÁr¿	©X«mÁZV¨ÁØTV¨RO	U)
L«mÁª#¡ #¡tÏ
2015]11z11s—11z16s 
2015]11z11s 
2014L]Ð¼.L_ ?)L«mÁJ+80 
­6J$106j 
J × L  L   
¢¤ 
26j 
_ ? 9j 
xÂ_f_·`_ ?»Ý»_ ? 
Þ¶Å_?Pf_;_4¯f_ 
Þ_ 
VL 8j ?GVQÚVL\1VL·`ÎVueVLYVL/CVLÆVL 
' 5j ÔLQÚ¾EAÓ·~Lp}L'Ê 
]Ä 2j ·DL·!L 
ÛÒ 2j PL°± 
¢¤30
j 
_ ? 10j 
Ð¼>_Ð¼_ÍË_ ?bD_ ?9¸_ ? 
/f_·~_ ?Ig8Ë_§_ ? 
/Ì³_ 
Elementary 
school 7j HQV¹ºVLqVLÐ¼VL·~VLÜ-VLV 
' 6j PPQ»L-LPPL 
]Ä 4j uvLbDL:yL:ÖL 
ÛÒ 3j Ð¼L·`Linf 
¢¤ 
39j _ ? 13j 
Ù_ ?NMÅ_?D_ ?_ 
Üa_ ?·`_vÇ_ ?ÔÎf 
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PQÚ_ ?w_ ?Þ__ 
\7>½B_ ? 
Elementary 
school  11j 
\ÑVL´?L»VLueVÔVLÙVL®ÑVLPQ
V¦£VL²/VPGV 
' 7j /'Ð¼>Þ¶LÞLÜ-'p¬L'Ê 
]Ä 4j 9¸L§L4¯LW 
ÛÒ 4j Ð¼?ÛÐ¼ÛÊp}LÛÊ 
  
ÈJ 
11j 
Elementary 
school 4j ;V VLVL²VL 
' 3j 2L²/®ÑL 
]Ä 2j ehL/L 
ÛL 2j ÛÌÛ 
  
 &q&mJ<ÃJ$3× 
¥( ×/i 
&q&mJ 
1 \1VL
oK,n|d3 
2 Pf_ ?
S*\5cÀ 
ÃJ 1 ÕW]*f
LG*=kÉ 
  
F)VL%"{Áµ@	 Áª^#[	3J+© 
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APPENDIX H: SCHOOL M1 PARTICIPANTS INVENTORY  
Participant title grade 
level(s) 
subject lesson
s 
leader gender years 
experience 
years at M1 hometown 
1 administrator  n/a 0  female 25 4 Shanghai 
2 teacher 3 Chinese 13 bzr female 23 8 Shanghai 
3 teacher 3 English 14 rd female 3 3 Shanghai 
4 teacher 1, 2 science  grs female 2 2.5 Shanghai 
5 teacher 3 physical 
education 
11 grs female 12 4 Shanghai 
6 teacher 4 Chinese 12 bzr female 32 10 Shanghai 
7 teacher 5 English 10 ss female 12 8 Shanghai 
8 teacher 3 information 
technology 
11  male 4 4 Shanghai 
9 teacher 2 science 14 ad female 10 10 Shanghai 
10 teacher 3 math 13 grs female 12 8 Jiangsu 
11 teacher 2 Chinese 13 bzr; 
grs 
female 6 4 Heilongjiang 
12 teacher 1, 2 Music 16 ss female 16 3 Jiang xi 
13 teacher 
administrator 
1, 2 Art 17 ss female 22 10 Shanghai 
14 teacher 3 English 13 grl female 2 2 Shanghai 
15 teacher 4 math 15 bzr female 1 1 Shanghai 
16 teacher 1 Chinese 16 ss female 15 15 Shanghai 
17 teacher 5 art 12  female 8 6 Shanghai 
18 teacher 4 music 11  female 7 5 Shanghai 
19 teacher 5 Chinese 13  female 6 6 Shanghai 
20 teacher 1 math 14 bzr female 3 3 Shanghai 
21 teacher 2 art 12  female 4 4 Shanghai 
